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I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article will focus on two proposals to revise our federal income
tax system, the Armey flat tax 1 and the USA tax. 2 Our goal is to
compare these tax reform measures with our current Internal Revenue
Code (Code) for income tax in three areas: (1) corporate stock

1. H.R. 2060, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 1050, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995) (introduced by Rep. Armey and Sen. Shelby). ·
2. S. 722, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), (introduced by Sen. Nunn and Sen.
Domenici). Other consumption-tax type proposals made in the past few sessions of
Congress include (1) a National Retail Sales Tax, H.R. 3039, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1996); and (2) The Revenue Restructuring Act of 1996, H.R. 4050, 104th Cong., 2nd
Sess., 142 CONG. REC. E1572 (No. 124, daily ed. Sept. 11, 1996) (introduced by Rep.
Gibbons, would replace the income and social security taxes with a modified Value
Added Tax/ Income Tax combination). Rep. Gephardt has proposed a 10% tax (but not
a consumption tax), eliminating virtually all deductions, except mortgage interest.
Recent studies of these proposals include: JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION
AND ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS TO REPLACE THE FED. INCOME TAX, reprinted in 37 TAX
ANALYSTS' DAILY TAX HIGHLIGHTS & DOCUMENTS 3587 (1995), and in 67 TAX NOTES
1491 (1995) [hereinafter JCT REPORT]; AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS &
MARTIN A. SULLIVAN, PH.D., FLATTAXES AND CONSUMPTION TAXES: A GUIDE TO THE
DEBATE (1995) [hereinafter THE DEBATE]; TREASURY DEP'T OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS,
AN ANALYSIS OF THE NEW ARMEY-SHELBY FLAT TAX PROPOSAL, reprinted in 96 TAX
NOTES TODAY 5-84, Jan. 8, 1996, available in Westlaw, TNT database, 96 TNT 5-84
[hereinafter ARMEY-SHELBY]; KEMP COMM'N, REPORT OF THE NAT. COMM'N ON
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TAX REFORM (Jan. 17, 1996), reprinted in 96 TAX NOTES
TODAY 12-46, Jan. 17, 1996, available in Westlaw, TNT database, 96 TNT 12-46.
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redemptions and divorce; (2) the use of alimony trusts; and (3)
nonqualified deferred compensation (so-called "rabbi") trusts.
While many economists and tax lawyers say it will never happen, we
may well be only a few years away from a fundamental change in our
tax system. Political leaders are all quietly dancing around with it.
Sadly, they don't seem to really understand what it is, and the general
public is very much in the dark.
Both the flat tax and USA tax proposals create a novel approach to
moving from an income tax to a consumption tax. They fold consumption tax concepts into both the taxation of business and individuals. The
business side is a modified value-added tax (VAT), taxing all active
business, but not investment profit. They would eliminate the present
double tax on corporate profits, one of the long-standing criticisms of the
current income tax, treating all businesses (including partnerships,
limited liability companies, limited liability partnerships, S corporations,
and self-employed persons) in the same manner. This would eliminate
the artificially created tax differences among business entities, and would
be a major reform of an area laden with unnecessary complexity-moving taxation of business to a higher plane of tax policy.
The individual side of the proposals adopts a personal consumption
tax, albeit by two different timing methods, where the emphasis is on tax
incentives to save. The flat tax would include in an individual's gross
income only cash wages, pension, and certain fringe benefits. Amounts
invested would not be deducted from current income, and the income
from these investments (dividends, interest, royalties, capital gains)
would not be taxed on later receipt. The USA tax, by contrast, would
include in gross income the items we currently include, and would allow
a full deduction for the amounts invested or saved,3 resulting in a tax
only on what is consumed. Some economists claim that the two
approaches produce the same result, assuming the tax rates stay constant
over the years. Stated another way, the theory is that allowing a full
deduction for investments or savings in the year made (the USA tax) is
the equivalent of allowing no deduction against income in the year the
investment is made, but not taxing the income or gain therefrom when

3. For discussion of the special (unfavorable) treatment of certain non-productive
real estate, under both proposals, see Lester B. Snyder & Marianne Gallegos, Redefining
the Role of the Federal Income Tax Law: Taking the Tax Law "Private" Through the
Flat Tax and Other Consumption Taxes, 13 AM.J. TAX POL'Y 1, 23 (1996).
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it is realized in subsequent years (the :flat tax). The USA tax method is
sometimes referred to as a "cash-flow" type consumption tax, where
savings are deducted from current income and taxed when consumed in
a later tax period. The :flat tax adopts what is sometimes referred to as
a "tax prepayment" method. But this applies only to wages, which are
taxed in the year received, with any yield or return from that portion of
wages invested or saved not taxed again when received in subsequent
years. 4 It is thus necessary to understand this so-called tax equivalency
theory to understand the differences between the :flat tax and USA tax.
A more detailed analysis of the tax equivalency issue is covered in Part
II.C below.
.
The basic goal of these proposals is to create a tax base which
includes only business income (which may, as in VAT countries, be
passed on to the individual consumer), wages, and personal consumption.5 In summary, the underlying rationale of these proposals appears
to be the notion of taxing business profit only once by: (1) eliminating
the potential double tax on corporate earnings, which under the current
system, taxes profit and gains realized at the corporate level and taxes
dividends received by shareholders at the individual level; (2) allowing
businesses to fully expense capital purchases; and (3) eliminating the
related double tax on an individual's savings.

4. The two methods may be illustrated by an example based on the JOINT COMM.
ON TAXATION, REPORT ON FLAT TAX PROPS. reprinted in 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 65-11,
Apr. 4, 1995, available in Westlaw, TNT database, 95 TNT 65-11:
The USA Tax Method: If T earns $25,000 and saves $1,000, which is
deducted from his salary, then at a 20% tax rate he saves $200 in taxes in year
one. If the amount saved earns 5% and he collects $1,050 in year two, his tax
is on the full $1,050 at 20% or $210, leaving T with a net of $840. Under the
USA Tax, ifT reinvests the $1,050 in another investment in year two, he can
again postpone a tax on the $1,050 until a later period when he stops saving,
or withdraws the investment and consumes it. The Flat Tax, "tax prepayment
method" allows no deduction in year one for the $1,000 savings by T (in
effect T prepays his tax on the amount saved), but excludes the yield or return
on the $1,000. This leaves T with $800 to save. In year two, he has $840
($800 x 5% = $40) with no tax on his investment return of $40, le;wing him
with the same $840 as under the USA Tax. This assumes, however, that the
same effective tax rate applies throughout the investment period. Since the
Flat Tax statute provides for an annual inflation adjustment for the standard
deduction, H.R. 2060, supra note 1, § 63(e), one can question the validity of
the tax equivalency theory where the effective tax rate is likely to change
annually. For other problems with the tax equivalency theory, particularly the
treatment of losses, see Snyder & Gallegos, supra note 3, at 68-69 & n.271.
5. The likely tax incidence of these proposals (i.e., who ultimately bears the tax,
the consumer or capital investor),· is discussed in a recent study by MICHAEL J.
McINTYRE & C. EUGENE STEUERLE, FEDERAL TAX REFORM, FAMILY PERSPECTIVE 2025 (1996) (prepared for the Finance Project, Washington, D.C. 20005).
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There is no assurance that these proposals would increase our rate of
savings. But they are clearly compatible with a more pervasive aim of
"downsizing" the federal government ·and returning (by Treasury
estimates) over $130 billion each year in foregone tax revenue to the
private investment sector. 6 Such a transfer to the private sector would
increase the amount of private savings.
Much of what has been written to date on these proposals presumes
Congress will be writing on a clean slate. However, many of the
concepts referred to in the consumption tax bills borrow heavily from
current income tax law. For example, the long-time troublesome
distinctions between "earned income" (salaries and wages) and "investment income," between "trade or business" and "passive" investments,
and between "ordinary" and "capital" gain are retained in the USA tax,
but in a different format. The flat tax also sails between Scylla and
Charybdis since it too amends the current Code and uses income tax
terms, despite the aspersions cast on it. 7
The three limited test sites we have selected for evaluation historically
have raised the type of broad-based policy issues and controversies that
permeate the present system: Redemptions of corporate stock in a family
business as part of a divorce raise conflicting tax results between the taxfree interspousal transfer provision and the corporate stock redemption
and dividend rules; alimony trusts raise issues of assignment or shifting
of capital and its income in satisfaction of a spousal support divorce
agreement; and "non-qualified" deferred compensation trusts (including
so-called "rabbi trusts") raise the postponement of tax liability and
related timing problems. All three topics involve double-tax, constructive receipt, and drawing the line between "services" and "capital"
issues.
In assessing the pros and cons of the proposed changes in our tax
structure, we will collaterally address four related questions: ( 1) How
much simplification would be achieved?; (2) Have the proponents of
these tax reforms, in their goal of encouraging savings and eliminating
"double taxation" of business profits,8 paved the way for undertaxation
of some recipients of these profits?; (3) To what extent do these

6.
7.
authored
8.

ARMEY-SHELBY, supra note 2.
Some material in this Article is taken from the senior author's article, cowith Marianne Gallegos. See Snyder & Gallegos, supra note 3.
For a discussion of the double tax issue, see id. at 14-15, 54-56, 61-68, 70-81.
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"consumption" tax proposals require us to reassess our traditional
"income" tax views on tax avoidance?; (4) Are there appropriate
safeguards against abusive techniques in converting "consumption" into
disguised "savings"?; and (5) To what extent would we be required to
cast aside conventional tax planning and tax policy concepts in the new
tax regime?
Part II of the Article will address the stock redemption/divorce issues
using the facts in the Ames case. 9 Part III will discuss the use of trusts
in two hypothetical cases: alimony and deferred compensation.
II.

DIVORCE AND REDEMPTION

A.

(OF

STOCK, THAT

IS)

Fact Pattern

John and Joann Ames owned and operated a McDonald's Corporation
(McDonald's) franchise in the state of Washington, a community
property state. 10 The franchise was held by a corporation called Moriah
Valley Enterprises, Inc. (Moriah). 11 The articles of incorporation
included a right of first refusal on the part of the corporation to purchase
the shares of any stockholder wishing to sell. The other shareholders
had a right of second refusal. 12
After several years of marriage and operating the franchise together,
John and Joann separated and ultimately obtained a divorce. Pursuant
to their divorce, McDonald's informed John and Joann of their policy
concerning dissolution of marriages of owner-operators. Essentially,
only one of them could end up owning the business. To accommodate
McDonald's, 13 Moriah redeemed Joann's shares in return for an
installment note as part of the property settlement, with John as the
note's guarantor. Joann reported and paid the tax to the IRS (Service)
on the gain realized on the redemption of her shares in Moriah. She
subsequently filed a refund suit in the U.S. District Court, claiming that
the redemption of her stock should not be deemed a taxable sale of her
stock back to the corporation under section 302(a) of the Code, 14 but
should instead be treated as a non-taxable transfer of her Moriah stock
directly to John under another section of the Code, 15 which permits a
tax-free interspousal transfer of property. She obtained a summary
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
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Ames v. Commissioner (John Ames), 102 T.C. 522 (1994).
Id. at 523.
Id.
Id.
And, presumably, John Ames, since he ended up as the sole stockholder.
I.R.C. §§ 301, 302 (1996).
I.R.C. § 1041 (1996).
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judgment in her favor, with the court deciding that the transfer of stock
to the corporation was really for the benefit of John. 16 The IRS also
lost on appeal in the Ninth Circuit. 17
In a separate case in the Tax Court, the IRS then proposed to tax John
as the recipient of a "constructive dividend" from the corporation on the
theory that the corporation in effect paid his debt to Joann on his behalf.
A divided Tax Court ruled against the IRS, however, holding that the
redemption of Joann's stock by the corporation could not be deemed a
dividend to John under case and IRS ruling precedents. 18
B.

Results Under Current Law

Under the current Code, the fundamental issue in these two cases is
which section of the Code prevails in a redemption of a shareholder's
interest brought about incident to• a marital property settlement in a
divorce. Because of this statutory conflict, and because the IRS failed
to combine the two Arnes cases, Joann received $450,000 for her stock
interest in Moriah without any tax to her or to John, who remained the
sole shareholder of the corporation, and on whose behalf the corporate
funds were paid. Transfers between spouses or former spouses are not
taxed, with certain limitations for those transfers incident to divorce. 19
The payee spouse pays a price for that nonrecognition treatment by
taking a carryover basis on the transferred property,20 which effectively
defers but does not forgive the tax due on any appreciation.
By contrast, in the more general area of redemptions of a
shareholder's interest by a corporation, section 302(b)(3) (and the safe
harbor provisions of section 302(c)(2)21 that disable the constructive

16. Ames v. United States (Joann Ames), 91-1 USTC ,r 50,207 (W.D. Wash.
1991).
17. Ames v. United States (Joann Ames), 981 F.2d 456,457 (9th Cir. 1992).
18. Ames v. Commissioner (John Ames), 102 T.C. 522, 526 (1994).
19. I.R.C. § 104l{a). Transfers between former spouses that are incident to their
divorce may be accomplished up to a year after the end of the marriage, id. §1041 (c)(l ),
or is related to the cessation of the marriage, id. § 1041(c)(2). The regulations spell out
a rebuttable presumption that such a transfer must occur within six years of the end of
the marriage. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-lT(b) (1984).
20. I.R.C. § 104l{b).
21. Id. § 302(c)(2).
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ownership rules contained in section 318)22 govern redemptions of a
family member's interest.
Thus, if a family member completely redeems her interest in a close
corporation where the remaining shareholder is another family member,
then, even though the remaining shareholder(s) may be related within the
meaning of section 318(a),23 the redeeming shareholder normally is
taxable on her gain, albeit at the lower capital gain rate. 24 The "sale"
of her stock is not treated as a dividend to the redeeming shareholder in
this context.25 As for the non-redeeming (or continuing) shareholder
(John, in our case), the Tax Court noted the "well established" test that
the non-redeeming shareholder normally "realizes no gain or loss or
dividend income solely because all or a portion of the stock of another
shareholder was redeemed, even though the effect of the redemption is
to increase his percentage ownership in the corporation."26 The
application of these rules assumes that the standard redemption does not
confer a sufficient benefit to the remaining family member/shareholder.
But there is a potential trap for the ill-advised under the current tax law.
When "the remaining shareholder blundered into incurring a direct and
primary obligation to purchase the stock, which he belatedly attempts to
shift to the corporation,"27 the cases are far less clear. 28 However, the
Service seemingly ended the controversy by issuing Revenue Ruling 69608, setting forth examples illustrating when a nonredeeming
shareholder's promise to purchase the redeemer's stock was "primary

22. Id. § 318(a).
23. Id. Parents, spouses, children, and grandchildren, not to mention related
entities such as partnerships, trusts and other corporations can have their shares attributed
to the redeeming shareholder under§ 318(a), often with the consequence of changing
the characterization of the corporate distribution.
24. The current maximum rate on long term capital gains, for individuals, is 28%.
I.R.C. § l(h) (1996).
25. Id. § 301(c). Distributions defined as dividends (which are made from the
corporation's earnings and profits under § 316) are treated as ordinary income. The
remaining amount in excess of basis is given capital gains treatment. Id. § 301(c)(3)(A).
26. Ames v. Commisioner (John Ames), 102 T.C. 522, 534 (1994) (citing Wall
v. United States, 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir.1947), and Holsey v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d
865 (3d Cir., 1958)); see also Edler v. Commissioner, 727 F.2d 857 (9th Cir., 1984),
ajf'g 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 508 (1982).
27. Arnes (John), 102 T.C. at 535-536.
28. Alan L. Feld, Divorce and Redemption, 64 TAX NOTES 651, 652 (1994).
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and unconditional."29 In other words, whose obligation is it-the
corporation's or the remaining shareholder's?
Thus, the key technical question, as Alan Feld reminds us, as to which
of these two mechanisms (section 302 redemptions, or section 1041
transfers between spouses) should govern a redemption of a spouse's
interest in the family corporation that is incident to her divorce from the
remaining shareholder, centers on whether the latter, in this case John
Ames, had an unconditional obligation to redeem Joann's stock based
upon the deferral of division of the marital assets under section 1041.30
IRS temporary regulations also allow section 1041 to govern transactions
between Joann and Moriah on John's behalf by providing coverage of
transactions involving third parties. 31 In the Arnes case, the critical
question was whether or not Joann's redemption of her shares was "on
behalf of' John, making the redemption of Joann's shares a "primary
and unconditional obligation" of John's, 32 or whether it was a transaction between Joann and the corporation where John was not a primary
party. The Ninth Circuit and Tax Court came out on opposite sides of
the issue. The entire experience, which to date has not been further
pursued by any of the parties, indicates the complexity of the current
system and the importance of observing certain forms in order to achieve
certain tax results.
In contrast to the contradictory results that the Ninth Circuit and the
Tax Court reached in the Ames cases, another recent Tax Court case,
Hayes v. Commissioner,33 illustrates a situation where the husband
clearly did incur a primary obligation and thus liability for a constructive
dividend. In Hayes, the divorce decree initially ordered the husband to
pay his wife for her interest in the family corporation. A later nunc pro
29. Rev. Ru!. 69-608, 1969-2 C.B. 42; see also Feld, supra note 28, at 652. "The
Service said it would continue to assert constructive dividend treatment against [the
remaining shareholder] if his obligation to acquire the stock from the [redeeming
shareholder] was primary and unconditional.
However, when [the remaining
shareholder] was only secondarily liable" there would be no constructive dividend
treatment. Id.
30. Feld, supra note 28, at 652.
31. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-lT(c) (1984). This temporary regulation, which
takes the form of questions and answers, asks in Q-9 "[m]ay transfers of property to
third parties on behalf of a spouse (or former spouse) qualify under section 1041 ?" Id.
(Emphasis added). The answer is yes, "provided all other requirements of the section
are satisfied." Id.
32. Rev. Ru!. 69-608, 1969-2 C.B. 43.
33. 101 T.C. 593 (1993).
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tune order modified the decree ordering the corporation to discharge the
note. This follows another case, Sullivan v. United States,34 where the
Eighth Circuit held that if a buyer who is under a primary obligation to
buy the shares from a second party has the corporation redeem them
instead, he will be deemed as having received a constructive dividend by
this discharge of his obligation. 35 The situation in Sullivan was so clear
that Rev. Rul. 69-608, mentioned above as seemingly ending litigation
over primary obligations, uses it as "situation 1" in describing how a
primary obligation will result in a constructive dividend. 36
1.

Ninth Circuit

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court finding that Joann's
redemption fell under the aegis of section 1041. 37 The court based its
decision on the trial court having found that Joann's redemption was
made "on behalf of' John because he had a "primary and unconditional"
obligation to Joann, which the transfer relieved him of.3 8 The court
found that John's obligation to Joann was based upon the divorce
property settlement and that Joann's right to sue John did not involve the
corporation. 39 In the Ninth Circuit's eyes, then, John fell afoul of Rev.
Rul. 69-608, and (though not a party in that case) should incur the tax
liability as a constructive dividend when Moriah redeemed Joann's
shares. 40 Joann was entitled to her refund. 41 This analysis pointed to
the ascendancy of section 1041 over section 302 in areas where they
clashed, which the Ninth Circuit justified by pointing to legislative
history behind section 1041 as intending the section to "defer the tax
consequences of transfers between spouses or former spouses."42
2.

Tax Court

The Tax Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's analysis, relying instead
upon the Service's previous pronouncements describing an agreement
34. 363 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 905 (1967).
35. BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ,r 9.06[6], at 9-45 (6th ed. 1994 & Supp. 1995).
36. Rev. Ru!. 69-608, 1969-2 C.B. 42; see also Thomas Monaghan, Corporate
Redemption in the Context of Marital Dissolutions: I.R.C. § 1041 and Ames v. United
States, 68 WASH. L. REV. 923,931 (1993).
37. Ames v. United States (Joann Ames), 981 F.2d 456, 457 (9th Cir. 1992).
38. Id. at 458-59.
39. Id. at 459.
40. Id. (citing Schroeder v. Commissioner, 831 F.2d 856, 859 (9th Cir. 1987)).
41. Id. at 460.
42. Id. at 458 (citing H. R. REP. No. 98-432, pt. 2, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1491,
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 1134).
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between two shareholders that the corporntion would redeem the stock
of either in the event .of his or her death. 43 The court held that the
marital property settlement, like the shareholder agreement, did not
create a primary and unconditional obligation on John's part,44 thus
upholding the redemption treatment that John and Joann originally
envisioned in their property settlement negotiations, in which Joann was
to bear the tax burden as capital gain upon recognition of cash received
under the terms of the note.

3.

Assessing the Argument

The net effect of the two cases was a "whipsaw result ... of [the
Service's] own making."45 The Service got caught between two
interpretations of which section of the Code should govern in the area
of closely held, family corporations incident to divorce. In his
concurring opinion, Judge Beghe pointed to the legislative purpose
behind section 302, which was "to bear lightly on withdrawals from
incorporated partnerships,"46 and the reliance that John, Joann, and their
counsel placed upon this background to the bright line rules of section
302. 47 This section governs how to characterize income as either
ordinary or capital gain.

43. Ames v. Commissioner (John Ames), 102 T.C. 522, 528 (1994) (citing Rev.
Ru!. 69-608, 1969-2 C.B. 42, 44). The Tax Court directly used sitµation 5 to support
its position:
A and B owned all of the outstanding stock of X corporation. An agreement
between A and B provided that upon the death of either, X will redeem all of
the X stock owned by the decedent at the time of his death. In the event that
X does not redeem the shares from the estate, the agreement provided that the
surviving shareholder would purchase the unredeemed shares from the
decedent's estate. B died and, in accordance with the agreement, X redeemed
all of the shares owned by his estate.
In this case A was only secondarily liable under the agreement between A
and B. Since A was not primarily obligated to purchase the X stock from the
estate of B, he received no constructive distribution when X redeemed the
stock.
Id. (citing Rev. Ru!. 69-608, 1969-2 C.B. 43.)
44. Id. at 530 (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.3-416(1) (West 1979)).
45. Id. at 541-42 (Beghe, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 540 (quoting Marvin A. Chirelstein, Optional Redemptions and Optional
Dividends: Taxing the Repurchase of Common Shares, 78 YALE L.J. 739, 749 (1969)).
47. Id.
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With section 1041, Congress sought to use bright line rules to define
who shall bear the tax burden in transfers between spouses and thus
decrease the litigation and uncertainty that "relentlessly whipsawed" the
government in the wake of the landmark case of United States v.
Davis. 48 In that case, the' husband transferred some appreciated stock
to his wife pursuant to a property settlement agreement. The Court held
that this transfer was not a gift and that he had realized a taxable
gain. 49 The worst part of this outcome was that "it frequently imposed
a heavy tax burden at the worst possible time-when a couple's finances
were in disarray and every available dollar was needed to finance the
transition from one household into two." 50 Section 1041 relieves the
spouses of the burden of paying taxes for a recognition event that often
generates little or no cash. Congress specifically designed section 1041
"[t]o correct these problems, and make the tax laws as unintrusive as
possible with respect to relations between spouses."51
This purpose is entirely congruent with section 302 in the sense that
both seek to minimize the tax burden in the changing of close, often
family, relationships making the transition easier, and indeed, even
possible. For instance, section 302 has specific rules to allow for
generational changes in ownership of family held businesses at the lower
capital gain rate. That is precisely the point behind section 302(c)(2),
which de-triggers the family stock attribution rules where the redeeming
shareholder severs her entire interest in the corporation. Section 1041
accomplishes a similar goal by deferring recognition of gain in a marital
context, shifting any future gain, nonetheless, to the spouse remaining as
the sole shareholder of the corporation. Both sections recognize that the
taxpayers need cash to pay their taxes. Very often, these transactions
produce very little cash. Therefore, it is preferable to defer recognition
until such time that cash is realized. The best way to achieve that goal,
as well as maximize certainty of treatment for the divorcing couple, as
Judge Beghe said in his concurring opinion, is to observe the bright line
rules of Rev. Rul. 69-608, which will both minimize the tax burden52
and place it on the spouse who has the cash. 53

48. 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
49. Id. at 66-7; see also MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
85 (7th ed. 1994).
50. Michael Asimow, The Assault on Tax-Free Divorce: Carryover Basis and
Assignment of Income, 44 TAX L. REV. 65, 67 (1988).
51. Id. at 69 (citing H. R. REP. No. 98-432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1491 (1984)).
52. Ames v. Commissioner (John Ames), 102 T.C. 522, 541 (1994).
53. While approximately $290,000 of the consideration was actually in the form
of a corporate note (carrying 9% interest), no issue was raised in these cases as to the
potential applicability of the installment method of reporting any gain under I.R.C.
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Yet, this position appears to have something of a "form over
substance" flavor. The taxpayers have to be technically careful to ensure
that any agreements to buy out one shareholder do not create this
primary and unconditional obligation on the remaining shareholder.
Insensitivity of the parties to the nuances of Rev. Rul. 69-608, such as
when their divorce agreement requires one spouse to purchase the other's
stock, which is later modified by a court order allowing the corporation
to pay the note after the "purchasing" spouse had already agreed to
assume. primary obligation on it, will subject the purchasing spouse, as
the remaining shareholder, to a constructive dividend. This unhappy
consequence befell the unfortunate husband in Hayes v. Commissioner.54 Tax reform. proponents could point to this seeming anomaly as

§ 453. If the transaction was deemed a stock redemption under § 302, then Joann's
realized capital gain would be the difference between the fair market value of the note
and her basis in the stock. If the transaction was a tax-free interspousal transfer under
§ 1041, then no gain would attach to the note received, thus eliminating the relevance
of § 453. Interest on the note, however, should be taxable to Joann. The chief
disadvantage of the installment method, where it is relevant, is that the size of the
obligation, which is in excess of $150,000, could run afoul of the interest charge rules
of§ 453A(b)(l). But, this section imposes interest only if the aggregate face value of
all such obligations exceeds $5 million, only a remote possibility for this transaction.
I.R.C. § 453A(b)(2)(B); see also BORIS I. BITTKER & MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR.,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ,r 41.3[3] (2d. ed. 1995). However, if
Joann were to sell or otherwise dispose of the note before the expiration of the ten-year
expiration date, the general rule of I.R.C. § 453B(a) provides for an acceleration of any
unreported gain, by subtracting the "basis" of the note from the amount realized. But
it would be inconsistent with the non-recognition of gain structure under§ 1041 to tax
the transferor spouse (Joann) on any later disposition of the note. Section 453B(b) could
be argued to resolve this problem by defining the "basis of the obligation" as "amount
equal to the income which would be returnable were the obligation satisfied in full. "
I.R.C. § 453B(b) (emphasis added). Since no income, other than interest, should be
taxed, perhaps the realized, but non-recognized gain, should be deemed part of her basis.
The reference to§ 1041 transfers in§ 453B(g) seems to refer only to the case where the
property transferred to a spouse under § 1041 is itself a pre-existing installment note,
which is not our case.
54. 101 T.C. 593 (1993); see also supra text accompanying notes 21-29; BITTKER
& EUSTICE, supra note 35, ,r 9.06[6], at 9-46 n. 216; Feld, supra note 28, at 654.
The underlying principle was memorialized by the Supreme Court in Old Colony Trust
Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929), where the corporation attempted to pay the
income tax obligations of its president above and beyond the nearly $1 million
compensation paid directly to him. The Court held that the corporation's payment of tax
was income imputed to him.
This theory of imputing income to a shareholder by assessing a constructive dividend
is codified in a different context in I.R.C. § 7872, where foregone interest on loans
between related persons (including corporations and their shareholders) is imputed and
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a prime example of the current system's arbitrary nature. It does not
treat substantively similar transactions in a similar way, violating a basic
premise of tax equality. But, in Rev. Rul. 69-608, "form" is the
"substance."55 Lines have to be drawn and definitions made in order
to administer the system. Indeed, this issue goes to the very heart of any
discussion of tax reform. It arises in both of ·the consumption tax
systems under examination in this Article. 56
To illustrate the importance of achieving the correct form, consider the
couple above who, unlike the Ameses, arrange for one spouse to buy the
other out directly. While the transaction appears to be equivalent to
Arnes, it differs in that, contractually, they have distributed the tax
burden differently. If John, for instance, were to have bought Joann's
stock directly for a note payable to her, section 1041 would defer any
tax on him until he sold that stock. 57 However, John would not only
be using his own after-tax dollars (instead of corporate pre-tax dollars),
but his stock basis would not reflect the amount he actually paid for the
stock. Instead, under section 1041(b), John would be required to carry
over Joann's lower stock basis, similar to a donee of a gift. 58 Joann
would escape tax entirely, since she received cash or a note. 59 This
would, theoretically, reduce the amount he would be willing to pay her
to the amount she would have realized, after tax, had the corporation
redeemed her stock (by issuing a note similar to John's) in a taxable
non-spousal transfer, outside of section 1041. The inequality of
bargaining power between the two spouses in particular cases, however,
makes the section 1041 result less laudable than has been assumed by
those who embrace that section's rationale. 60

then treated as a constructive dividend. Another example, and even more directly on
point in this case, is found in the regulations: "The cancellation of indebtedness of a
shareholder by a corporation shall be treated as a distribution of property." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.301-l(m) (as amended in 1995); see also, BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 35, ,i
8.05[6], at 8-46.
55. BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 35, 'l! 9.06[6], at 9-45 n.214.
56. Snyder & Gallegos, supra note 3, at 69.
57. I.R.C. § 104l(b)(l) (1996).
58. Id. § 1015.
59. Joann could be liable for a deferred tax, as in John's case, had she received
some of John's low basis property in addition to the cash or note, and later sold that
property. Id. § 1041(b)(2). A potential for a double tax exists if the corporation is
deemed to have been the real purchaser of her stock where the consideration consists of
appreciated corporate assets. Section 31 l(b), as part of the 1986 Congressional repeal
of most of the General Utilities doctrine, now taxes the corporation on the built-in gain
on the appreciated property distributed in redemption of stock. This coupled with either
a capital gain or dividend to the distributee-shareholder results in double taxation.
60. See, e.g., Asimow, supra note 50, at 73-84.
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A court order for John to pay Joann would have the same effect as a
direct stock purchase by John: a primary and unconditional obligation.
However, if a court were to order the corporation to redeem Joann's
stock, Rev. Rul. 69-608, at least as interpreted by the majority of the
Tax Court, seems to assure that John would not receive constructive
dividend treatment, even though John's benefit arguably exceeds that of
the corporation--all because the corporation .has the court ordered
obligation--and not John. 61
Up to this point, analysis has focused only on the individual and how
interactions with a close corporation can produce--or not produce-taxable events and their ultimate characterization as either
ordinary income or capital gains. In the sections that follow, the same
issues will be highlighted in the context of how the various consumption
tax proposals will treat them. These sections will also focus, to a certain
extent, on the corporation and how certain events can shift or defer the
corporate tax burden in ways that are quite alien to the current system,
but presumably consistent with the fiat tax and USA tax proposals.
C.

Results Under the Flat Tax, HR. 2060
1.

Simplification

The entire controversy that arose in the Arnes cases over who should
bear the tax burden, and for what reason, would seem to vanish under
the fiat tax. When John and Joann divorced, John caused Moriah to
redeem Joann's stock in return for a note. The note, as a redemption of
corporate interest, would seemingly make the section 302/section 1041
controversy moot. Because the gain on the investment has theoretically
been taxed at the corporate level, it does not get taxed again upon
distribution to the investor. The fiat tax avoids double taxation by only

61. Feld, supra note 28, at 652. Feld writes that the effect is to give practitioners
a "clear line" with which to plan. Id. at 653; see also Asimow, supra note 50, at 73-84.
Asimow refutes the charge that carryover basis, which is consistent with § 1041 (b)' s gift
treatment of inter-spousal transfers, somehow is biased against the nonworking spouse.
He shows the importance of negotiating the property settlements to account for the tax
burden that will eventually come due. But, the disparity of bargaining power between
the spouses may, in some cases, minimize the advantages of negotiation for one of the
spouses.
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taxing wages at the individual level. The distribution, since it is not a
wage, falls outside the tax base.62
Changing the form of the transaction to that of John paying Joann
directly with an equivalent note--essentially the Hayes case-effectively
shifted the tax burden from the wife to the husband as a constructive
dividend under the current Code even though the· corporation actually
paid the note. Under the flat tax, the outcome is exactly the same as
having Moriah redeem Joann's interest: Both transactions fall outside
the tax base. 63 The involved controversies described in the previous
section simply become irrelevant. That irrelevance ensures that both
transactions, similar substantively, are tre_ated similarly by the tax
system. The flat tax also protects taxpayers, like the unfortunate
husband in Hayes, from double taxation, once at the corporate level and
then a second time at the individual level.· The only price paid is a
drastic narrowing of the tax base, just as Hall and Rabushka envisioned
when they first proposed the flat tax in the 1980s. 64 However, this
simplification raises another issue: What is a wage?
2. · Wages Versus Investment Income

This issue is definitional, just as it is under the current law. However,
the fault line runs not between ordinary income and capital gain as in the
current system, but between wages and investment income because the
former is taxed to the individual and the latter is not. 65 But, an
argument can be made that a component of Joann's stock redemption
can be structured as deferred--and disguised--wages on which neither
she nor the corporation may pay tax. Even if the corporation were to
pay a tax, it represents a major shifting of the incidence and timing of
the tax.

62. H.R. 2060, supra note 1, § 63(a).
63. We are assuming, throughout this article, that the corporation is not distributing
appreciated property (a so-called "in-kind" distribution) to the shareholder in redemption
of her stock. A distribution of appreciated property, without a tax at the corporate level,
would eliminate all taxation of business profit at both the business and individual levels,
even after the business had fully expensed the purchase of this type of property. (Under
the USA tax, however, the shareholder would include the fair market value of the
property received in her income, with a deduction for certain reinvestments of this
property.) While the flat tax does not, as currently drafted, address the problem of
corporate distributions of "in-kind" property, presumably it would follow the USA tax
provision(§ 211) which adopts current law by treating the distribution as a taxable sale
of the property at its fair market value.
64. ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2d ed. 1995).
65. H.R. 2060, supra note 1, § 63.
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Varying the Arnes scenario will illustrate this issue in a fairly stark
manner. Suppose that the Ames, when they formed Moriah,66 only
paid themselves a relatively small wage, say $50,000 per annum each as
owner-operators, for their services. If they had to pay two executives
$100,000 per annum to operate Moriah so that they could do something
else, they would have paid $200,000 in total compensation, instead of
just $100,000 in any given year. The flat tax would tax wages paid for
services rendered during the tax year. 67 But since the proposed flat tax
rate of seventeen percent is the same at both business and individual
levels, aside from payroll taxes, the same total tax would be paid
whether or not the owners receive salary or dividends. 68 For example,
if the business paid only $100,000 in compensation instead of the
$200,000 wages that would have been paid in an arms length employment relationship, the $100,000 lower business level deduction for wages
would increase the business tax by $17,000. However, if the lower
salary were distributed instead to the owners as a dividend (not taxable
under the flat tax), the owners would have $17,000 less tax to pay.
Thus, either way the owner-operator chooses to withdraw profits from
her business, the same total tax is paid. 69
However, the flat tax biases their investment decision by encouraging
John and Joann to leave their profits in the corporation. A major new
incentive allows businesses a full write-off in the year of purchase of
"property used in business,"70 such as equipment and other assets
bought for expansion. These business level deductions thus reduce its
tax by seventeen percent of the amount of business purchases. On the
other hand, since owners such as John and Joann are not given a
deduction for their individual financial investments under the flat tax, 71

66. Our discussion assumes all transaction take place after the effective operative
date of these tax proposals, disregarding, for this purpose, any special basis adjustment
and other transition rules that might be in force.·
67. R.R. 2060, supra note 1, § 63.
68. In fact, any distribution to the owners, even in redemption of their stock, would
be non-taxable to the business and to the owners.
69. There is a built-in assumption in this example (and in the flat tax proposal,
itself) that the IRS would not try to recharacterize the dividend as a constructive wage
for payroll or other tax purposes. However, the proponents of this tax reform have
expressly disavowed any attempt to coordinate the flat tax with our current payroll tax
system. See HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 64, at 77.
70. R.R. 2060, supra note 1, § 1 l(d)(2)(A)(i).
71. Cf the unlimited savings deduction under the USA tax, discussed below.
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an investment of wages received from the business starts at an after-tax
amount which is seventeen percent smaller. In other words, an individual
level financial investment must outperform business asset purchases to
a considerable degree, although the margin of difference will become
less the longer the holding period for the two types of assets. 72
Deferring the corporate tax (bya full 100 percent deduction for business
assets. purchased) will thus produce a higher yield on those types of
investments made through the corporation. 73

3.

Business Expenses and Borrowing

Next, let us assume that at the time of the divorce, the business had
a large operating loss carryforward (generated by fully deducted business
asset purchases which exceeded the gross income of the business). The
loss carryforward could be large enough to ensure that, although
profitable from a cash flow standpoint, the corporation was paying little
or no tax. As discussed above, both the flat tax and the USA tax allow
for immediate expensing of all business asset purchases, regardless of
whether or not they are capitalized or currently deductible under present
law. To use current tax jargon, one way to regard this full expensing
mechanism is that it postpones recognition of any gain. In this context,
there is no real matching of revenues and expenses to a particular period.
It allows deferral of any payment of tax until some later period. This
forms the very heart of the bias for keeping business profits in corporate
solution.
Moreover, borrowing by the business, as others have recognized, can
potentially provide even more of a deferral-to the point of allowing
withdrawal of dividends/profits in a period earlier than that in which the
business tax would otherwise come due. Some observers have argued
that not taxing borrowed money when first received by the borrower is
the economic equivalent of denying a deduction for the repayment of the

72. While businesses are not taxed on investment income (such as interest,
dividends and capital gains), in keeping with the value-added tax philosophy, they are
also not allowed a deduction for financial assets, including stock in other corporations.
Business operating losses are carried forward, however, under rules similar to current net
operating loss rules, but with the addition of an interest refund component. H.R. 2060,
supra note 1, §§ ll(d)(2)(A)(i), dll(g). The USA tax has similar provisions. S. 722,
supra note 2, §§ 203, 205(a)(3)C), 212, 207.
73. One example of this point: If John and Joann were to leave $100 with the
business which buys an asset with a 5% rate of return (exclusive of the tax effect), then
in five years, the business should be worth $127.63 more than without the business
investment. A financial asset purchased by John and Joann, with after-tax wage dollars
· ($83), to achieve the same result, must produce a return of 8.99% return ($127.63) on
the original investment.
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interest and principal on the theory that the value of the loan at its
inception equals the present discounted value of the future interest and
principal payments. 74 However, when a business uses those loan
proceeds to purchase business assets, which are fully deducted in the
year of purchase, it is likely to generate loss carryforwards (excess of
deductions over current income) that defer taxes for several tax years.
This carryover of excess deductions against future years' income also
yields the equivalent of an additional deduction computed by using the
interest refund component. 75 The use of tax-free borrowed money in
this fashion adds up to much more than the "net present value" of the
cash stream of loan repayments. 76

4.

The Divorce andBeyond: New Tax Planning Opportunities

If John and Joann decide to, end their marriage and redeem her share
of the corporate ownership utilizing the above-described process of
having the, corporation apply her foregone salary to fully deductible
business asset investments, thus generating loss carryforwards, both the
corporation and Joann are accorded substantial tax benefits. Joann
receives a note from the corporation; secured by John, just as in the
Arnes case, payable over a ten year period. 77 Under the flat tax, she
would not be taxable on any of it because it is nominally a return on her
investment. But, as can be seen from our previous discussion, part of
her investment might be more properly deemed deferred compensation
that was reinvested in the corporation.
For the purposes of our scenario, we can quantify the size of each
yearly investment as the difference between the wages Joann was paid
and the wages that would have been paid in an arms-length employment
relationship-$50,000 per annum for the period of time she and John
operated the business together, say ten years. 78 Thus, $500,000
($50,000 foregone salary x ten years) of Joann's note received for selling
74. THE DEBATE, supra note 2, at 188.
75. See supra note 72.
76. See Appendix at end of this Article (for a sample illustration of the effect of
borrowing to purchase business assets and the resulting tax deferral benefits).
77. Although the form of the transaction has no tax significance under the flat tax,
both John and Joann escape individual taxes regardless of whether John or the
corporation bears the primary and unconditional obligation on the note.
78. This assumes a return in corporate growth in earnings of 10%, which is much
less than the previous examples.

1503

her stock back to the corporation is presumably transformed, under the
flat tax, into a form. of "savings." Joann is not taxed on this "principal"
of her note nor the interest earned on it, since they are not "wages."
The corporation is also likely to escape, or greatly minimize, the
business tax if John keeps investing on behalf of the corporation during
this period, making judicious use of borrowing and any loss
carryforwards on its business asset investments (for example, expansion
of its operations). The planning would become more complex ifwe take
into account John's future tax burdens, resurrecting the current concepts
of time value of money and net present value. Through the use of
proper planning, John can defer a good deal of tax, thus reducing his
burden as well.
If John were to sell out eventually, in years to come, he also would
not pay any tax. However, the corporation will have to pay taxes on its
profits during those years in which its expenses did not exceed revenues.
Because of the nature of the expensing, a corporation's tax burden rnay
vary quite significantly, depending upon what capital investments have
been made and when--all of which lend to a considerable amount of tax
planning.
If John were to perform a "sale and seller redernption," 79 the buyer
could purchase the business for very little cash out if John were willing
to take a note. In another alternative, the corporation could also borrow
the funds necessary to redeem. John out of the business. John would not
be taxed on the amount received since it was not wages. Assuming that
Moriah could borrow that much, John would be better off since he
would not face the risk of Moriah's continued viability under new
ownership. Moreover, he could also borrow funds him.self and then
assign the note to the corporation in return for his stock. He could also
just assign the note to the corporation and have it pay it off. Under the
flat tax, all of these are exactly the same-transactions that fall outside
the tax base. By tax planning as described above, John could defer any
tax that would come due on the corporation's part for a significant
number of years. The amount for which he could sell the corporation
would be decreased by the net present value of the expected tax burden.
This would, in fact, shift John's tax burden to the business's new owner.

79. So named in BITIKER & EUSTICE, supra note 35, ,i 9.06[2], from a two-step
transaction where the stockholder first sold a portion of his stock to the buyer and then
had the corporation redeem the remainder under I.R.C. § 302(b)(3). The Service
attempted to recharacterize this using the step transaction doctrine so as to obtain
dividend treatment of the redemption, when the redemption preceded the sale but
ultimately failed. See Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213 F.2d 914, 917 (1954); see also, BITIKER
& EUSTICE, supra note 35, ,i 9.06[2], at 9-39 to 9-40.
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Perhaps the best way that the two parties could value the potential tax
burden would be by using the tax value of the expense carryforwards at
the point of sale. This would represent the amount of deferral that the
buyer would inherit from John's investment activities.
Compare any of these alternatives to the tax burden that John and
Joann would have borne had they been paid a salary-taxable at
seventeen percent in the year in which it was received. In Joann's case,
she would have received substantially less than if she had left the wealth
in corporate solution and, in effect, reinvested in the business. John, in
later years, would face much the same choice: take it now and pay
seventeen percent, or leave it in corporate solution until the point of sale.

D.

Results Under The USA Tax, S. 722
1.

Simplification

It has been observed that "[t]he Nunn-Domenici [USA tax] proposal
is not as simple as the flat tax, nor is it as sweeping in its elimination of
tax preferences."80 The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants attributes this to "realistic accommodations that may be necessary
to ensure sufficient political support for enactment."81 But, the USA
tax's treatment of income and discharge of indebtedness raise some
complications and revive the "form over substance" debate. 82 The
"form over substance" debate also vitiates the notion that the flat tax and
cash flow, or classic type consumption taxes, are equivalent. The
decisions made about how to structure a particular transaction may
change the tax treatment quite radically, thus influencing the decisionmaking process when structuring that transaction. 83 The influence of
a tax system's design on such decision-making and differing outcomes
between the flat and cash flow taxes also manifests itself in other ways.

80.
81.
82.
83.

THE DEBATE, supra note 2, at 124.
Id.
See supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
Id.
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2.

The Definitional Problem in the USA Tax and the
Fallacy of Tax Equivalency

To return to the scenario discussed in the flat tax section, let us
assume that John and Joann are married, owner-operators of Moriah,
running a McDonald's as their primary business. If they paid themselves $50,000 each when the value of the services they render to
Moriah would be $100,000 each in an arms-length employment
relationship, they would be taxed in each year on the $50,000 with a
deduction for whatever they saved and did not consume. 84 If they paid
themselves $100,000 a year and then saved $50,000 in investments other
than Moriah, then they would only be taxed on the $50,000 each that
they consumed. 85 The remaining $50,000 would not be taxed as long
as it remained invested. The definitional fault line that appears between
different types of income in the current system (ordinary versus capital
gain income) and the flat tax (wages versus investment income) recedes
in the conventional consumption system, since it taxes only that wealth
which is consumed. 86
Conventional analysis assumes tax equivalency between the flat tax
and the cash flow type consumption tax embodied in the USA tax. 87
As described in the Introduction of this Article,88 the theory of tax
equivalency is that allowing a full deduction for investments or savings
in the year made (the USA tax) is the equivalent of allowing no
deduction against income in the year the investment is made, but not
taxing the income or gain therefrom when it is realized in subsequent
years (the flat tax). The flat tax adopts what is sometimes referred to as
a "tax prepayment" method. But this applies only to wages, which are
taxed in the year received, with any yield or return from the portion of
wages invested or saved not taxed again when received in subsequent
84. S. 722, supra note 2, § 201.
85. Id.
86. For a complete theoretical discussion of a consumption tax, see William
Andrews' seminal piece that appeared in the Harvard Law Review over twenty years
ago. William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax,
87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974). Andrews describes the consumption system as "a cash
flow income tax [which] would correspond very closely to another ideal, that of a tax
whose burdens are apportioned to current personal consumption expenditures rather than
to total accretion." Id. at 1116.
In this issue, Alan Schenk describes the current rationales for adopting a consumption
tax/VAT business tax. See Alan Schenk, The Plethora of Consumption Tax Proposals:
Putting the Value Added Tax, Flat Tax, Retail Sales Tax, and USA Tax into Perspective,
33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1281 (1997).
87. See HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 64; see also JCT REPORT, supra note 2.
88. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
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years. The equivalency theory is only valid if the same effective tax rate
applies throughout the investment period. 89 For instance, if rates rose
over time, then the "tax prepayment method" (the flat tax) would both
effectively tax at a lower rate than the "cash flow method" (the USA
tax) and be less effective at raising actual tax receipts in the future. 90
It would also change behaviors by either subsidizing saving, if rates
decreased over time, or subsidizing future consumption.
On the surface, the effect of the business taxes in the flat tax and the
USA tax appear to be quite similar. Assuming that Moriah has the same
expenses under the USA tax as under the flat tax scenario, where it pays
little or no business tax, John and Joann would receive roughly
equivalent treatment during the period prior to getting divorced. 91 This
assumes, however, that the business expenses are high enough that the
lack of salary deduction under the USA tax does not change the result.
Under the flat tax, wages are deductible on the theory that they will be
taxed in the same period on the individual side. Under the USA tax,
wages and salary are not deductible beyond the payroll tax credit. 92
Thus, even at tax equivalent rates, John and Joann would pay a much
89. The flat tax statute provides for an annual inflation adjustment for the standard
deduction, thereby automatically changing the effective tax rate annually. H.R. 2060,
supra note 1, § 63(e). Tax rates, historically, have changed quite frequently, and there
is no reason to believe that this would not occur under the proposals discussed.
90. This is because the wages in the tax base in period one are taxed at, say, 17%,
and the investment income in subsequent periods, when the tax rates are higher, are
outside the tax base, regardless of whether it is consumed or rolled over into savings.
91. This assumes equivalent tax rates for both regimes on both individuals and
businesses. However, the USA tax has a lower tax rate on businesses (11 %) and an
eventual graduated tax rate on individuals from 8% to 40%. S. 722, supra note 2, § 13.
92. The USA tax provides for a 7.65% payroll tax credit to both businesses and
individual taxpayers. (Payroll taxes refer to the 6.2% OASDI tax on both employer and
employee-up to the taxable wage base, which is $62,700 for 1996----and 1.45%
Medicare tax on both employer and employee, for a total of 15.3%. I.R.C. §§ 31013128 (1996).) The combination of the savings deduction from personal income and the
payroll tax credit potentially will allow John and Joann to defer nearly indefinitely any
tax burden, with their funds successfully extracted from the corporate solution and
diversified. However, this is true only to the extent that the payroll tax credit offsets
actual payroll taxes and the tax on wages paid. If the payroll tax credit is lower than
the employer and employee regular tax rates, then the recharacterization of dividends as
wages is less attractive to both parties. The nondeductibility of salaries at the business
level, which is taxed at a rate of 11 %, will not, as presently proposed, be sufficiently
mitigated by .the 7.65% payroll tax credit. Likewise, the taxability of wages to the
employee at rates higher than the payroll tax credit only partially minimizes the tax
burden.
For further analysis, see Snyder & Gallegos, supra note 3, at 49-51 & nn.193-202.
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higher marginal rate on their consumption under the USA tax than they
would under the flat tax. But both systems bias investment decisions in
favor of John and Joann leaving their profits in corporate solution.
Under the flat tax, John and Joann gained an immediate return on
investment by leaving their profits in corporate solution. The motivation
is not as great under the USA tax as under the flat tax, because the
business tax rate is eleven percent (USA) versus seventeen percent (flat).
However, if the rates were equivalent, then the motivation would be no
different. The variations in treatment could potentially lead to some
very different decisions about consumption versus savings, depending
upon which system they were taxed under. 93
The motivation for the business to borrow may even be greater under
the USA tax, 94 to the extent that the payroll tax credit provision does
not provide an equivalent effect to the wage deduction available under
the flat tax.

3.

Divorce and the Return of "Form is Substance"

When John and Joann do divorce, matters start to vary under the USA
tax depending on how the parties structure their transaction. Let us
assume that Joann has her shares redeemed for the same note from the
corporation as it was under the flat tax. 95 Joann is separately liable for
a tax on her realized gain as she receives it from Moriah. 96 However,
if she invests it, she will receive a deduction, 97 but, to the extent that
she consumes it, she will have to pay a tax. Her tax burden is entirely
up to her, as is the timing of when she pays the tax.
On the other side of the transaction, other things remaining equal,
Moriah will make payments on its note to Joann directly from corporate
profits, thus ensuring that the transaction bears a business level tax in the
appropriate period because it cannot take a deduction for this payment.
Thus, John, as the sole shareholder of the corporation after the purchase
of Joann's stock, will be encouraged to negotiate with Joann to obtain
a decrease in the redemption amount that reflects a more equal
distribution of the tax burden between them. But, if John were to
continue to invest in Moriah by either leaving the excess cash flow with
the business, or by borrowing so as to expand more rapidly, the

93. Any variation in decision-making finishes whatever tax equivalence there
may have been to start with.
94. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (for further discussion of borrowing).
95. See supra note 63 (when appreciated property is distributed to shareholder
instead of cash).
96. S. 722, supra note 2, § 15.
97. Id. §§ 50-58.
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aggregate tax burden might be deferred well into the future, thus
reducing the burden substantially.
However, the tax consequences might vary if John were to buy
Joann's stock directly from her for a note payable to her over ten years
and then assign the note to Moriah. The USA tax defines income in
much the same way as the current system. 98 But the statute then
creates a dichotomy between gratuitous discharge of indebtedness and
discharge in return for "services, property or other valuable right."99
If the corporation's assumption of the note were gratuitous, the
consequence would be the same as if the original agreement had required
the corporation to pay the note: John would not have any tax at the
individual level. This is because the USA tax specifically excludes gifts
from the individual tax base, 100 just like the current system 101 and the
:flat tax. 102 But this note potentially, at least, is taking the form of an
employer gift to an employee.
In order to prevent the potential for tax avoidance attendant to
characterizing a commercial payment or compensation as a gift, the
current Code does not extend its general exclusion-of-gift to employer
gifts to employees. 103 The USA tax would seem to require the same
exception, otherwise taxpayers could potentially exploit the gaping hole:
Employers could disguise compensation in the form of gifts by assuming
employee debts. Gain to the employee could be excluded from
individual tax (as high as forty percent). But, if the USA tax does
utilize the exception, then another problem could potentially force the
individual to pay tax on "income" when no ca~h is received with which
to pay it and with no opportunity to take a savings deduction. 104 This

98. Income from discharge of indebtedness is included in the definition of income
under S. 722, supra note 2, § 3(a)(10).
99. Id. § 4(a)(9) (excluding from income discharge of indebtedness if not for
"services, property or other valuable right").
100. S. 722, supra note 2, § 4(a)(3)(A).
101. I.R.C. § 102(a) (1996).
102. Hall and Rabushka would tax only "compensation," thus excluding gifts
completely from the tax base. HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 64, at 142, 144.
103. I.R.C. § 102(c) (West 1995) ("Subsection (a) shall not exclude from gross
income any amount transferred by or for an employer to, or for the benefit of, an
employee.") This is because those from an employer to an employee are not true gifts.
The inquiry focuses on whether the donor had a "detached and disinterested generosity."
Id.

104.

S. 722, supra note 2, § 50.
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arises in the context of the fact pattern of Hayes, 105 discussed previously, in which "form" is sometimes deemed the "substance" in the current
Code. 106
This distinction made little difference under the flat tax because the
entire transaction stood outside the tax base, where the assignment of the
note was not defined as compensation. 107 · However, under the USA
tax, if John, as in Hayes, gave Joann a note in return for her stock, and
then assigned the note to Moriah, two outcomes could occur. If it were
classified as a gift-an anomalous result that would lead to the abuse
described above-then no tax would be incurred because it would fall
outside the tax base. Alternatively, if there were a ban on employer/employee gifts, the government could enforce payment of tax on the
value of the note as it is realized because it is not a gift, but a payment
resulting from an employer-employee relationship since John is an
owner-operator of the company.
·
An alternate ground for taxing the transaction can be found in another
old case, Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 108 where discharge
of an obligation by a third party r_esulted in a tax liability to the
taxpayer. The effect of Moriah paying off John's note enriches him in
just the same way that a corporation paying its president's income tax
enriches the president. 109 The result would be the same to John
regardless of the rationale-he would have to pay a tax on the note just
as Mr. Hayes did when he bought out his wife. 110 But this outcome,
which fits into the modified definition of income under the current
system, 111 would seem to run counter to the basic tenet of the USA
tax-taxation of consumption--and deferral of taxes on savings. John
will have to recognize the discharge of the note in a year in which he
cannot realize a concomitant savings deduction, for he has nothing to
deduct. He would presumably have already taken a deduction for the
stock he originally purchased from Joann and then paid her on an
installment basis using taxed income in repaying a debt. When the note
is discharged by Moriah, he will then have income, but no cash with

105. Hayes v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 593 (1993).
106. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
107. Id.
108. 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
109. Id. The regulations also memorialize the cancellation of indebtedness of a
shareholder by the corporation as a constructive dividend. Treas. Reg.§ 1.301-l(m) (as
amended in 1995); see also supra note 32 (discussing constructive dividend treatment
of below market interest rate loans between related persons); BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra
note 35, ,r 8.05[6], at 8-46.
110. Hayes v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 593 (1993).
111. See Feld, supra note 28.
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which to either pay the tax or purchase 1-1- savings instrument to avoid the
tax. Merely by taking the primary obligation rather than letting Moriah
redeem Joann, John will be materially worse off. This seems to echo the
outcome of Rev. Rul. 69-608 that "form is the substance here" 112-an
outcome that tax reform is supposed to eliminate.

4.

Sale of the Business and Tax Planning Under the USA Tax

If John finally sells to Moriah, years later at a much larger value than
when Joann redeemed her share, he faces a tax burden unless he
reinvests. He too, can plan his tax burden and the timing of when, if
ever, he pays a tax. If John has continued to reinvest in the business
over the course of time, he will have potentially deferred taxes--or at
least a good deal of it-well into the future. John would face a potential
tax burden personally, but only to the extent that he does not utilize the
. savings deduction. 113

III.

THE USE OF TRUSTS: EXPLORING ALIMONY AND
DEFERRED COMPENSATION

"Put not your trust in money, but put your money in trust."
-

Oliver Wendell Holmes,
The Autocrat of the
Breakfast-Table II

This part of the Article will explore, rather tentatively, how the flat tax
and USA tax would change the basic structure of the current income tax
treatment of trusts and estates. Because the proposals are incomplete
and do not yet address some critical issues, our analysis is sometimes
based on a blind-faith hope that we captured the essence of what the
proponents have in mind.

112. BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 35, ,r 9.06[6], at 9-45 n.214.
l 13. John would also be able to utilize such techniques as a "sale and seller
redemption." See discussion supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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A.

Taxation of Trusts Under Current Law 114

Trusts are separate legal entities that pay taxes on their current year's
income, unless it is distributed to the beneficiaries (or unless the income
is taxed directly to the grantor who retained some controls over the
trust-referred to as a grantor trust). Trust income is generally
determined in the same manner as for individuals and corporations.
Dividends, gains, losses, and expense deductions are included or
subtracted from gross income to arrive at taxable income. fucome that
is accumulated by the trust for later distribution to a beneficiary is taxed
to the trust; the beneficiaries pay a tax on distribution under the so-called
throwback rules, but the beneficiary receives a tax credit (with limits) for
the tax paid by the trust. 115 In 1993, Congress compressed the tax
rates for trusts and estates so that the highest individual rate bracket
(39.6%) starts at $7,900 of taxable income. 116
Although a creature of British common law, dating back to the Statute
of Uses in 1535,117 and as someone once suggested, perhaps "conceived in sin as a device to hide money from the King," the trust has
become an integral part of American life. Because it is utilized as a
means of dividing ownership of property into two historically denominated components-"legal" title and "equitable" title-it serves a wide
number of purposes. By transferring legal title to property to a trustee,
a settlor (grantor) can assure herself that a beneficiary (the equitable
owner) will not have direct access to the trust property or that the
property will be managed by the trustee so as to minimize the chance of
its being dissipated. Conversely, in the alimony context, trusts offer the
beneficiary spouse a measure of assurance that she will receive the
support payments without the need to rely on periodic checks issued by
the payor spouse. The trustee is also subject to a higher fiduciary duty
than is an individual. However, trusts have historically been an ideal
way to reduce one's tax burden. Examples of this are: (1) by shifting
income-producing property to a lower bracket family member (but the
increased rates on trusts starting with 1993 have curtailed this advan-

114. Our discussion of the income taxation of trusts under Subchapter J, I.R.C.
§§ 641-692, will apply generally to estates as well.
115. I.R.C. §§ 661-668 (1996).
116. Id. § l(e). These higher rates provide a disincentive for accumulation of
income in a trust or estate and place into question the continued use of trusts for
assignment of income purposes. However, the trust vehicle still offers estate and gift
tax and generation skipping opportunities, as well as the traditional non-tax reasons for
creating a trust in the first place.
117. 27 Hen. 8, ch. 10.
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tage ); (2) by avoiding a purportedly burdensome tax rule not applicable
to trusts or their beneficiaries--alimony, for example;" 8 and (3) by
generating a current charitable deduction for a contribution of a
remainder interest in property retained for a donor's use for the rest of
her life. 119 These multiple types of trusts, while convenient for those
taxpayers able to use them, create problems in resolving a number of
income tax issues under our current system. 120
Among the problems and issues are: (1) the role of state law in
determining what is property ("corpus") and what is income; (2) the
interrelationship between direct (non-trust) gifts of property and gifts of
income; (3) the remaining role of assignment of income; (4) the timing
and characterization of gains; (5) the difference between taxing the trust
and taxing the beneficiary; and (6) what to do about expenses incurred
by the trust on behalf of the beneficiary (more of a problem in a
consumption tax system).

B.

Alimony Trusts
1.

Fact Pattern

In contrast to the facts of the Ames case, 121 where Joann owned onehalf of the family corporation stock, let us assume instead that another
couple, Tom and Sue, are involved. Tom owns all the stock in a highly
profitable fast food franchise (Max's Inc.) under a license and operating

118. For example, the limitation on "front-loading of alimony payments" (to
distinguish spousal support from property settlements) and the requirement that liability
for alimony payments ceases at the death of the payee spouse, under the alimony rules
in I.R.C. §§ 7l(b), (f), can be avoided by using an alimony trust under I.R.C. § 682.
119. E.g., I.R.C. § 664 (1996).
120. Two of the many books on the income tax issues in trusts are: (1) HOWARD
M. ZARITSKY & NORMAN M. LANE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF ESTATES AND
TRUSTS (2d ed. 1993); and (2) Donna L. Seiden & Nicholas E. Christin, Income
Taxation of Trusts and Estates, [Estates, Gifts & Trusts] Tax Mgmt. Portfolios (BNA),
No. 852 (1996). The IRS, Statistics oflncome Division, publishes helpful tax return data
on a number of entities. Unfortunately, the latest information for estates and trusts was
published in 1985 (for the 1982 study). While this is critical data in evaluating any
reforms or abuses in the trusts and estates area, the IRS states that budgetary restraints
have prevented more current studies. See Letter from Thomas B. Petska, Chief, Special
Studies and Publications Branch, Statistics oflncome Division, Internal Revenue Service,
Washington, D.C., to Prof. Lester B. Snyder, Professor of Law, Univ. of San Diego
School of Law (Oct. 9, 1996) (on file with the Authors).
121. See discussion supra Part II.
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agreement with the national franchisor. Sue owns no stock and her
former spouse, Tom., agrees to satisfy his entire marital obligation to her
by creating an alimony trust. Under the terms of the trust agreement,
Tom. would transfer one-half his stock in the franchise to the trust. 122
The income from. the trust (dividends paid by the corporation) would be
paid to Sue for 15 years as the main source of spousal support; and at
the end of that period the trust would end, with the stock reverting back
to Tom., assuming they have no children. The trust would be otherwise
irrevocable, and the trustee would be a bank. The corporation will
guarantee payment of an eight percent dividend (from. its pre-tax profits)
on the $800,000 worth of stock being transferred to the trust. Tom's tax
basis in the stock, which he originally received as an inheritance from.
his parents, is $200,000. 123

2.

Results Under Current Law

If Tom. had retained full ownership of the stock and had paid over the
dividends he received to his ex-spouse as alimony, Tom. would have first
included the dividends in his gross income. Assuming section 71 of the
Code were otherwise com.plied with, 124 Sue would include the support
payments in her gross income and Tom. would be entitled to a deduction
from. gross income. 125 In effect, Tom. would be allowed to assign or
shift his income to Sue under a statutory regime created in 1942, as an
exception to the fundamental principle prohibiting assignments of
income (to preserve the graduated tax rate structure), as encunciated by
Justice Holm.es in the classic case of Lucas v. Earl. 126

122. We are assuming that the franchisor would permit Tom to transfer one-half his
stock to a trust without violating their policy ofrestricting stock ownership only to those
who are active managers. We are further assuming that there are no issues raised
because of one person owning 100% of the stock, although, as will be developed in the
next segment on deferred compensation trusts, Tom plans to expand the corporation by
acquiring additional franchises and by issuing stock to three or four new unrelated
investors.
123. We are assuming the inherited stock is not community property.
124. Among § 71 requirements for payments to a spouse to be deemed taxable
alimony are (1) that they are made in "cash", (2) that they end at the death of the payee
spouse, (3) that there is no front-end loading (substantially higher payments in the first
three years), and (4) that they are made under a court decree or court approved
agreement. I.R.C. § 71 (1996).
125. Id. § 215. The same result would occur if Tom received a salary from the
corporation (deductible by the corporation if "reasonable") and paid the alimony out of
that salary. See discussion of converting "wages" income to dividend income, supra Part
II.C.2, and infra Parts III.B.3-4, under the flat tax and USA tax discussions.
126. 281 U.S. 111 (1930). Prior to 1942, alimony was neither deductible by the
payor, nor taxable to the payee spouse. Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917). In 1942,
Congress changed this result by enacting what are now I.R.C. §§ 71, 215.
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By transferring the stock to an alimony trust, we move to a different
set of rules. Tom's stock transfer to the trust generates a realized gain
of $600,000 (assumed fair market value of $800,000 less adjusted basis
of $200,000). 127 However, the enactment in 1984 of I.R.C. section
1041 results in non-recognition of that gain, in effect allowing the
transferor to escape tax on the realized gain, by shifting the burden to
the transferee spouse who assumes the tax basis of the transferor. 128
Section 1041 applies to a transfer in trust as well. Thus, the alimony
trust for Sue will result in the trust carryover of Tom's $200,000 basis,
but assuming the trustee has no power to sell the stock during the
fifteen-year term., there should be no further sale or distribution of the
stock by the trust during that period. 129 The 1984 enactment of section
1041 has made the alimony trust a more attractive vehicle.
Once the stock is in an alimony trust, the spousal support provisions
of sections 71 and 215 no longer apply. Instead, the taxation of the
income derived by the trust is governed by the provisions of Subchapter ·
J-the rules applicable to trusts and beneficiaries. 130 The recipient

127. I.R.C. § 1001 (1996). For potential "special valuation" gift tax issue on
transfers in trust for "family" members, where transferor retains an interest, see Id.
§ 2702. The income tax definition of "gift" does not necessarily mesh with the gift or
estate tax definition. See, e.g., Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812 (2nd
Cir. 1947).
128. I.R.C. § 1041(b) (1996). Prior to 1984, a transfer of property to a spouse as
part of a divorce was deemed a taxable event to the transferor. U.S. v. Davis, 370 U.S.
65 (1962). The transferee spouse was not taxed on the property received and was
allowed a stepped-up basis to its fair market value. Rev. Ru!. 67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 63.
Davis generated a host of problems, including the imposition of a heavy tax burden on
the couple at an inopportune time, the lack of cash to pay the tax, the disparity between
common-law state taxpayers and community property state taxpayers (where division of
marital property was often inherently a tax-free equal division of jointly owned
property), and the claimed whipsaw effect on the IRS where the transferor paid no tax,
but the transferee received a fair market value basis. For a discussion of § 1041
rationales, see Asimow, supra note 50.
129. Complications arise in cases where the trust (or an estate) distributes property
in satisfaction of a bequest or devise where the beneficiary is entitled, under state law,
to a specific dollar amount or to specific property other than that distributed. I.R.C.
§ 643(d) (West 1995); Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.661(a)-2(f)(l) (as amended 1973). See
ZARITSKY & LANE, supra note 120, ,r 4.11 (for full discussion of this issue); see also
Seiden & Christin, supra note 120, at A-78. This appears to be a vestige of the rule that
satisfaction of a debt which generates gain results in tax to the debtor (the trust in this
case-when the specific property received by the beneficiary is not the specific property
willed to her).
130. I.R.C. § 682 (1996). It has been suggested that "wealthy individuals originated
such 'alimony trusts' as an income-shifting device in the era before an alimony
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spouse is taxable on the amount of trust income she is entitled to
receive. The spouse who created the trust is not entitled to any
deduction. In other words, Tom, in our example, would not be allowed
a deduction for the dividend income generated by the trust he created.
Technically, the dividend income would be included in the trust's
income, but the trust would deduct the amount it was required to
distribute to Sue, the sole beneficiary. 131 Section 682 creates an
exception to the grantor trust rules 132 when normally a grantor, such
as Tom, would be taxed on the trust income: (1) when the trust was
used.to pay his obligations; (2) when the trust was revocable or subject
to a reversion in the grantor; or (3) when the trust was otherwise under
his control. As a result, section 682 by-passes the grantor trust rules
where the income (and expenses) of the trust are attributed to the grantor
to be reported on his own return as if no trust existed.
The alimony trust does, however, raise a number of troublesome
issues. To mention a few, the statute allocates the "amount of income
of any trust" to the beneficiary spouse. Some confusion has developed
in determining whether tax-exempt interest is taxable to the spouse,
though not taxable to the trust. I.R.C. section 652(b), which states that
income shall retain the same character as in the hands of the trust, would
supposedly resolve that issue, but the IRS has litigated this point with
mixed success. Another issue is whether the section 682 format is upset
where the grantor retains the right to allocate income among beneficiaries, thereby taxing the grantor and not the beneficiary or trust.
Questions arise on child support payments. Section 682 specifically
excludes from its ambit amounts paid for child support, creating an
allocation problem in cases where the trust instrument is not carefully
drafted. 133
The alimony trust rules do, however, have some advantages for the
grantor. The restrictions in section 71, requiring alimony to end at the
death of the recipient spouse, and the front-end loading rules are not
applicable under section 682 trusts.

deduction was permitted by the Code". MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, 484 (3d ed. 1995).
131. I.R.C. §§ 651, 652 (1996).
132. Id. §§ 671-678. ·
133. For detailed discussion of these issues, see Roland L. Hjorth, Divorce, Taxes,
and the 1984 Tax Reform Act: An Inadequate Response To An Old Problem, 6 l WASH.
L. REV. 151 (1986).
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3.

Results Under the Flat Tax

How would Tom, Sue, and their alimony trust fare under the proposed
fiat tax?
The proposal is silent on the taxation of trusts and estates. The fiat tax
statute is deceptively simple; the entire tax portion is contained in fewer
than twenty pages. Since the alimony trust in our illustrative case is not
a "business activity," 134 it is not a taxable entity. The original proponents of the fiat tax, Professors Hall and Rabushka, provide some clue
in the question and answer chapter of their book:
Q: What about nonbusiness entities such as trusts, estates....
A: [A] conventional personal trust, which holds stock[s] and bonds, deals
entirely in after-tax income, so there is no reason for the tax system to pay
attention to it. 135
·
.

It is thus reasonable to assume that the intention of the proponents is not
to tax the trust or its beneficiaries! This would herald the end of
Subchapter J of the Code in what may first appear to be an unprecedented simplification of the income tax system. The presumption is that
dividend or interest income has already been subject to one layer of tax
at the business level (taking as a given that the business tax was not
passed on to the consumer), 136 and to tax it again would contradict the
removal of the double tax curse from the new tax regime.
While Tom, Sue, and the alimony trust would thus avoid tax on the
trust income, this is arguably the same result as when Tom or Sue
owned the stock directly. Dividends are simply not taxed to anyone. 137

H.R. 2060, supra note I, §§ l l(a)-(b).
HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 64, at 126.
In this Symposium, see Schenk, supra, note 86, and Reuven S. A vi-Yonah,
From Income to Consumption Tax: Some International Implications, 33 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1329 (1997) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Income to Consumption]. See also Reuven
S. Avi-Yonah, The International Implications of Tax Reform, 69 TAX NOTES 913,918
(1995) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, International Implications].
137. While this may create an incentive in the closely-held corporation to leave the
profits with the corporation to allow it to expand, the non-taxability of dividends may
have the unintended result in a publicly-held corporation. These shareholders may
pressure management to declare dividends, thereby creating the potential for less growth
in our major corporations. Cf ALVIN C. WARREN, JR., AMERICAN LAW INST., FEDERAL
INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE INCOME
TAXES, REPORTER'S STUDY OF CORPORATE TAX (1993) (report recommends a corporate
level withholding tax which would be offset against taxable dividends to shareholders).
134.
135.
136.
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Similarly, Tom would have no tax on the transfer of appreciated stock
to the trust, even without the help of a non-recognition provision such
as section 1041. Since the tax base under the flat tax includes only
"cash wages," any gain on the transfer of property to anyone is
inherently not taxed.
·
·
However, tax reform comes with a new premium on tax planning,
with higher stakes involved than under current law. If, instead of
funding his alimony obligation through the transfer of stock to a trust for
Sue, Tom were to take a salary, of say $120,000, from the corporation,
out of which he paid Sue $60,000 in spousal support, Tom would remain
taxable on the entire $120,000, with no deduction for the $60,000
alimony payment. Sue would not be taxed on the alimony, leaving her
with more spendable income than Tom. The flat tax proposed rate of
seventeen percent on Tom's income ($20,400), less the $60,000 paid
over to Sue, leaves Tom with a spendable income of $39,600, compared
to $60,000 for Sue. There is no obvious rationale for this result offered
by the flat tax proponents. This appears to discriminate against those
who receive their income from services in favor of those who have the
means and ability to transfer the amount of capital necessary to yield the
equivalent alimony to the recipient spouse. 138 It is not an assignment
of income problem, which is non-existent in a flat tax world. 139 In
other words, the goal of eliminating double taxation comes with a high
price tag, at least in this context, for those who render services. 140
The newly-created incentive in favor of dividend income versus salary
also reverses the roles of government and shareholder-employees of
closely-held corporations. Under current law, there is generally an
advantage for the shareholder-employee to take a higher salary, thereby
reducing the corporate level tax (and the concommitant double tax
burden). Dividends, as such, are not deductible by corporations under

Ostensibly the same issue is presented, but at least one tax would be collected.
138. Michael J. McIntyre and C. Eugene Steuerle recognize this disparity, adding
that elimination of the alimony deduction "would complicate life for former spouses who
reached divorce settlements before enactment of the flat tax." However, they point out
that the alimony deduction reduces taxes paid by the couples in the aggregate, resulting
in higher rates for other taxpayers. They further conclude that the impact of the taxation
of alimony payments in families with children is unclear. McINTYRE & STEUERLE,
supra note 5, at 47-48.
139. But the family allowance (up to $21,400 as proposed) would create some
incentive to shift income at the lower end of the income scale. This would also retain
the "marriage penalty" at that level. See Edward J. McCaffery, Equality of the Right
Sort, 6 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 289 (1996).
140. The flat tax methodology for curing the double tax on savings and capital
investment, by taxing only wage income, should be compared with the more equitable
(yet more complex) structure of the USA tax, in which all income is taxed in the first
instance, with a deduction for savings. See discussion supra note 4.
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current law, but "reasonable" salaries paid for services are deductible to
the corporation. 141 The taxpayer-shareholder is thus put in the position
of defending her salary against the IRS argument that a portion of the
salary is merely a disguised dividend. Under the flat tax, the government would prefer "salary" rather than "dividend" treatment. As for
Tom in our hypothetical case, the real difference between salary and
dividend, in an economic sense (at least while he is sole owner of the
corporate stock), may well be illusory, but the tax consequences are not.
The alimony trust, in a flat tax world, would be a more advantageous
way to meet one's support obligations than under current law, at least
for .higher income taxpayers with ample property to fund the trust.
Taxpayers who are unable to fund an alimony trust with capital are left
in the position of taxing the wage earning spouse on the entire income,
creating spendable income disparities.

4.

Results Under the USA Tax

In contrast to the simplified, but narrower, tax base of the flat tax, the
USA tax is much more complex. The individual side of the USA tax is
levied at graduated rates (from eight to forty percent) on worldwide net
income (gross income, as we now know it, less a redefined list of
deductions) 142 of U.S. citizens and resident aliens. 143 The "Big Pine-

141. I.R.C. § 162(a)(l) (1996); cf id. § 162(m) (limiting deductions for salary paid
to certain top executives to $1,000,000, unless the higher amount is based on
performance standards).
142. Among the deductions allowed are: child support payments (expanding the
alimony deduction), personal and dependency exemptions, and increased standard
deduction ("Family Living Allowance"), a more limited mortgage interest deduction, a
new education deduction ($2,000 for each student), a charitable deduction, and a general
basis account (primarily a transition adjustment) for those assets acquired under the preconsumption tax regime. S. 722, supra note 2, §§ 5,6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 57. A new credit
for social security taxes paid by businesses and individuals is allowed. Id. §§ 21, 281283.
143. Id. §§ I, 2, 15. The business component of the USA tax, an 11 % value added
type tax, includes only sales in the United States, which opens up a number of
international tax issues. See Avi-Yonah, Income to Consumption, supra note 136; AviYonah, International Implications, supra note 136 (discussions of GATT issues raised
by these proposals). A major asserted advantage of a destination principle VAT is that
it results in export/import neutrality trade by allowing border tax rebates for exports and
imposing a tax on imports. The flat tax on businesses does not allow for border rebates
on exports. Cf H.R. 4050, supra note 2 (adopting a modified VAT/income tax system
with tax rebates for exports similar to the USA tax).
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apple" 144 in the USA tax is the "unlimited savings account" for new
net savings. 145 Savings includes investments in stock, bonds, and other
securities, but excludes investment in land and certain other real estate
and certain tangible personal property, such as coins, stamps, and other
collectibles. 146 Withdrawals from savings (unless resaved) are taxable.147 Unlike the classic consumption tax, borrowed money is
generally not included in income, thus, interest and principal payments
are not deductible. 148
Returning to our illustrative case of Tom and Sue, the first question
relates to Tom's transfer of one-half his corporate stock to an alimony
trust for Sue. 149 Our search of the USA tax statute, as proposed, found

144. Taken from Martin D. Ginsburg, Life Under a Personal Consumption Tax:
Some Thoughts on Working, Saving, and Consuming in Nunn-Domenici 's Tax World, 48
NAT. TAX J. 585, 588 (1995).
145. S. 722, supra note 2, §§ 50-58.
146. Id. § 53.
147. Id. § 54.
148. However, the USA tax attempts to curtail the use of borrowed money to save.
Except for certain types of debt, such as mortgage debt on a principal residence and
consumer debt up to $25,000, borrowing will generally reduce (but not below zero) the
"net savings" deduction. JCT REPORT, supra note 2, at 3602. As Professor Alvin C.
Warren, Jr., notes, by allowing a deduction for "net savings," the USA tax does not
follow "the standard cash flow tax design of including all receipts (including borrowed
receipts) and deducting all nonconsumption payments (including payments of interest and
loan principal)." He then demonstrates that the USA tax method is more complex than
the standard model and does not always "properly account for liabilities". Alvin C.
Warren, Jr., The Proposal For An "Unlimited Savings Allowance," 68 TAX NOTES 1103,
1104 (1995); see also Committee on Simplification American Bar Association Section
of Taxation, Complexity and the Personal Consumption Tax, 35 TAX LAW. 415 (1982);
NICHOLAS KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX (1955); Andrews, supra note 86; Lee A.
Sheppard, The Consumption Tax: Borrowing as a Tax Shelter, 68 TAX NOTES 138
(1995) (discussing debt issues in both flat tax and USA tax).
149. We are assuming throughout this Article that all transactions and events
occurred after the enactment of each of these proposals. Thus, the transition problems
that would exist by transferring pre-USA tax stock-where the basis of the stock
represents after-tax capital and would require a mechanism to avoid taxing it again under
the new tax system-is not discussed here. Transition issues have been widely
discussed. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99
HARV. L. REV. 509 (1986); Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of
Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47 (1977); Shounak Sarker
& George Z. Zodrow, Transitional Issues in Moving to a Direct Consumption Tax, 46
NAT'L TAX J. 359 (1993); Louis Kaplow, Recovery of Pre-Enactment Basis Under a
Consumption Tax: The USA Tax System, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 171-47, Aug. 28, 1995,
available in Westlaw, TNT database, 95 TNT 171-47 (citing David F. Bradford,
Consumption Taxes: Some Fundamental Transition Issues (forthcoming)). Some
commentators take the position (perhaps an extreme one) that a new tax system is
doomed because of the transition problems, notwithstanding instances of major changes
in the tax law in the past 70-80 years. Granted these changes were not as formidable
as would be required to move to a consumption tax, many of the concepts of current law
would attach to the consumption tax proposals discussed in this Article. See, e.g., Lewis
Lyons, Pearlman: Transition Problems May Stop Reform, But Not an Add-On VAT, 96
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no specific provision on alimony trusts (a section 682 analogue) and no
provision on non-recognition of gain on spousal transfers in trust or
otherwise (similar to section 1041 of current law). However, the answer
might be built into the larger structure of the proposed statute itself.
The USA tax excludes the gain on the appreciated stock from the
general gross income rules. 150 The withdrawal from savings rules in
the unlimited saving account deduction would tax the transfer of stock
(a savings asset) to a trust, but the trust provisions in the USA tax trump
the general rule by not taxing transfers of savings assets to a trust. 151
The rationale for not taxing the transfer of stock to Tom's ex-spouse
may be to treat the transfer as a gift of appreciated property, similar to
current section 1041, even though the transfer is obligatory, as opposed
to gratuitous. The trust, or Sue, would presumably take Tom's basis
($200,000) for the stock. But why only transfers to a trust? If Tom had
transferred the stock to Sue outright in a divorce property settlement
(disregarding community property issues by assuming Tom inherited the
stock from his parents), would it be a gift or a taxable transfer? 152
If Tom has no new investments or savings in that year to offset the
gain on the transfer of the stock, his tax liability under the USA tax
could be as high as $320,000 (forty percent x $800,000). Using more
familiar jargon, his "realized" and "recognized" gain is the excess of the
fair market value of the stock ($800,000) less its basis ($0), or
$800,000. 153 Tom was allowed to deduct the full cost of the stock
($200,000) at the time of purchase (in a post-USA tax year), and has
therefore previously recovered his investment.

TAX NOTES TODAY 158-1, Aug. 13, 1996, available in Westlaw, TNT database, 96 TNT
158-1 (interview with Ronald A. Pearlman, former Chief qf Staff of the Joint Committee
on Taxation).
150. S. 722, supra note 2, § 3(a)(l 1) This section defines income to include:
"Gains on the sale or disposition of assets (other than savings assets)." Apart from the
parenthetical exclusion of "savings assets," this is analogous to § 1001 in the current
I.RC.
151. Id. § 54(a)(l).
152. Id. § 56(c)(l) (section is directed at "gratuitous" transfers by "donors").
153. This is a return to the pre-section 1041 era (pre-1984), when the decision in
U.S. v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), holding a transfer of appreciated property in
exchange for the release of marital property rights incident to divorce, was a taxable
event to the transferror. The policy reasons for the enactment of§ 1041, discussed supra
note 48 and accompanying text, do not disappear in the USA tax, and thus a § 1041
analogue should be added to the proposal.
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Assume, however, that the rules applicable to gratuitous transfers are
also applicable to obligatory family transfers such as spousal support.
The USA tax treats a "gift" of a non-cash saving asset as non-taxable
(not deemed a "withdrawal") to the donor. 154 The receipt of the gift
(or bequest) by the donee is not taxable, and the donee takes the donor's
basis, if any, in the asset. There is no new savings deduction for the
donee unless the asset is sold and the proceeds reinvested. 155 Cash
gifts, such as withdrawal of money from a checking account, will
presumably constitute taxable withdrawals to the donor. 156 Since the
cash has been taxed, it has a basis (disregarding the difficulty in tracing
basis in fungible property) equal to the amount of cash. The donee has
no income on receipt of the cash, and if she saves it, the donee would
be entitled to a full savings deduction. 157 In any event, on a transfer
of a savings asset to an alimony trust as a non-cash gift by Tom, Sue
and the trust itself would have no tax, but the trust would have a zero
basis (assuming Tom deducted the purchase of the stock in prior years).
The trust and beneficiary would then be taxed on the income from the
stock, as will be described below.
The combination of the limited definition of a savings asset and the
ability to borrow money to purchase a non-savings asset tax free, may
well confirm the drafters' fears that the tax bar "is poised to do them
in." 158 Professor Martin Ginsburg notes that the anti-abuse provisions159 "sprinkled about the USA Tax," such as concerns that taxpayers will borrow against their savings to consume (instead of withdrawing
the savings), suggest that there are inherent basic faults in the unlimited
savings allowance. 16 For example, it is possible that none of the antiabuse rules in section 58 of the USA tax prevent Tom from borrowing
$800,000, using a nonsavings asset, such as land or his personal
residence, or his deceased mother's jewelry collection as security, and
transferring the funds to an alimony trust, thus avoiding the withdrawal
tax. (Simply borrowing against his stock may be caught by one of the
anti-abuse rules, providing the Treasury Department adopts appropriate

°

154. S. 722, supra note 2, § 56(c)(l).
155. Id. §§ 4(a)(3), 56(c)(l), 56(c)(3), 4(a)(12). Note that there is no need for the
stepped-up basis rule in I.RC. § 1014 under the USA tax (or the flat tax either), since
savings assets are fully deductible at the time of acquisition, and non-savings assets are
not on the favored "species" list.
156. Id. § 56(c)(3).
157. Id. § 56(c)(3).
158. Ginsberg, supra note 144, at 590.
159. E.g., S. 722, supra note 2, § 58.
160. Ginsburg, supra note 144, at 590. For a critique of the the unlimited savings
account and the use of borrowed money, see Warren, supra note 148.
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regulations. 161 ) The complicated rules applicable to the taxation of
trusts would not seem to attribute any trust activity to the grantor, Tom,
during the fifteen-year term of the trust, taxing only the beneficiary on
distributions of trust income (and certain expenses incurred on her
behalf). 162 Many more planning opportunities would undoubtedly
surface. 163
Under the USA tax, Tom and Sue do have the option to have Tom
pay his alimony directly to Sue without the intervention of a trust.
Unlike the flat tax, the USA tax provides for the inclusion in income of
alimony (and child support) by the payee spouse and a deduction to the
payor spouse. 164 The alimony rules are not as restrictive as the current
law (for example, there are no front-end loading rules).
Assuming, however, that an alimony trust is workable for both
spouses, what are the likely tax consequences to the parties? The USA
tax does not tax trusts, but only distributions to beneficiaries. 165 While
the grantor trust rules (not defined) are said to apply, 166 there is no
provision, such as section 682 under current law, where the grantor trust
rules are overridden in alimony trusts, taxing the trust income to the
recipient spouse. 167 If the grantor trust rules do apply to the transferror

161. S. 722, supra note 2, § 58(c).
162. Id. §§ 141-146.
163. Professor Ginsburg posits the case of a wealthy person who borrows $12
million, secured by his residence, and then buys collectibles or land (non-savings assets).
Over the years, he turns these assets back into cash and then consumes it. "He never
borrows against his savings." Professor Ginsburg believes none of the anti-abuse rules
reach this case. Ginsburg, supra note 144, at 596-97. Those who are studying the
impact of the USA tax on behavioral and economic effects of the proposal should
consider the range of activity non-savers might enjoy without paying taxes.
164. S. 722, supra note 2, §§ 3(a)(7), 5.
165. Id. §§ 141-146.
166. Id. § 144(a) ("The provisions of this subchapter [dealing with trusts and
estates] shall apply to grantor trusts only if the grantor is an individual."). Employercreated deferred compensation trusts under current law are taxed as grantor trusts in
some instances, I.R.C. §§ 402,404 (1996), but where the employer is a corporation, the
USA tax appears to hang that issue in limbo.
167. See discussion of § 682, supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
Generally, a grantor trust is one where the grantor and not the trust or beneficiaries is
taxed on the trust income. I.R.C. §§ 671-679 (1996). The rationale for taxing the
grantor under these sections is based on retained control (such as a right to revoke the
trust or the use of trust income to pay the grantor's obligations, including spousal
support). Were the USA tax not to include a § 682 type provision, the grantor of an
alimony trust could, arguably, be taxed on the trust income. Presumably, the grantor
would then be allowed to deduct the amount paid as alimony to his ex-spouse. For a
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spouse, many alimony trusts would lose their purpose---to avoid the
alimony inclusion and deduction rules of sections 71 and 215.
In a major change from present law, the USA tax does not impose an
income tax on non-business trusts. 168 The income is instead taxed only
when distributed to the beneficiaries of the trust. 169 Advocates of the
USA tax offer this rationale for not taxing the trust as a separate entity:
"It is easiest to see why trusts and estates are not subject to the
Individual Tax by viewing them as complex savings or brokerage
accounts for their beneficiaries." 170 While in part true, the multitude
of different types of trusts in our country, ranging from estate and family
trusts, charitable trusts, personal residence trusts, land conservation
trusts, voting trusts, alimony trusts, to qualified S corporation trusts, each
having its raison d'etre, cover a variegated catch far beyond mere
"savings or brokerage accounts." Eliminating a centralized taxable entity
for trust income, and deferring tax until (or unless) distributed to
beneficiaries, will increase opportunities for the type of tax avoidance
which is not necessarily consistent with the goals of the USA tax. 171
Trust income can be accumulated and reinvested for periods of time, 172
through a non-taxable entity not subject to the savings and withdrawal
rules, with no tax until the income is distributed. Given the value of
deferral, enormous sums of tax revenue could be lost. The comparison
to the present pass-through entities, such as partnerships and S corporations, where the owners are taxed on each year's income, whether or not
distributed, is not applicable to the schematic proposed by the USA tax.
Trusts with more than one beneficiary (spouse and children, for
example) could be drafted to allow for distributions to one beneficiary
one year and another beneficiary the next. Since trust income account-

complete discussion of the taxation of grantor trusts and the many related questions, see
ZARITSKY & LANE, supra note 120, ~ 17.01.
168. S. 722, supra note 2, §§ 141(a),(b).
169. Id. § 14l(d).
170. Ernest S. Christian & George J. Schutzer, Alliance USA, Unlimited Savings
Allowance (USA) Tax System (prepared for Alliance USA), reprinted in 66 TAX NOTES
1481, 1546 (1995).
171. In the income tax context, early doubts as to the constitutional validity of
taxing shareholders on undistributed corporate income (a by-product of Eisner v.
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)) were laid to rest when Congress revised its method of
taxing accumulated earnings of corporations in 1921 by taxing the corporate entity rather
than the shareholders. See also, Helvering v. National Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282
(1938).
172. Subchapter J of the current I.R.C. has an elaborate (yet complex) set of rules
for distinguishing income from corpus, including the coordination of the trust instrument
with state law. See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT (1962 Act), 7B
U.L.A. 150; Cal. Revised Principal & Income Act, CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 16301-315
(Deering 1991).
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ing and allocations between principal and income are critical components
of "distributable net income," the need exists for allocation and ordering
in the distribution rules. By taxing only the beneficiaries, where the
trust has charitable or tax-exempt organizations or non-resident aliens as
beneficiaries, no trust income will ever be taxed.
There is a novel attempt in the USA tax to purportedly reduce the use
of a trust to pay expenses that may not have been deductible by the
beneficiaries had they paid the expenses out of their own pockets. Food,
clothing, shelter, and pleasure autos come to mind, but many other
consumption items could also be paid by the trust. There are two
mechanisms to control this. The first, when there is only one beneficiary
of the trust, is to have a "deemed" or constructive distribution of the
amount of these expenses; and the second, when there are multiple
beneficiaries, is to levy a special "proxy" tax on the trust itself, at the
highest marginal tax rate for individuals (forty percent). 173
The USA tax trust and estate provisions include some fairly comprehensive transition rules, which require separating the assets that were
held by the trust before the effective date of the USA tax system ("initial
assets") from those acquired after the effective date ("new assets"). 174
In summary, as for Tom and Sue, assuming these rules allow them to
use an alimony trust, Tom could probably transfer one-half his corporate
stock to the trust with no tax. 175 The trust itself would take his zero
basis (given that Tom deducted the amount he paid for the stock at the
time of purchase). Sue would not be taxed until she received a
distribution of trust income or had some personal expenses paid by the
trust. If the parties could arrange their divorce settlement so that Sue
did not require all the trust income for her support, a significant amount
of dividend income received from the corporation could be reinvested by

173. S. 722, supra note 2, § 143.
174. Id. § 141(d). Special basis rules and different rules for cash and in-kind
property are also present in the USA tax rules. A "previously taxed amount" (PTA) and
"non-previously taxed amount" (Non-PTA) are concepts included in the proposal which
are supposedly necessary to avoid taxing previously taxed income or capital again. Id.
§ 142.
175. We are assuming, for this illustration, that the trust is allowed to hold the
corporate stock, even though Sue is the beneficiary of the trust which is a 50%
shareholder, and that the "prohibited transaction" excise tax would not apply to this type
of nonqualified deferred plan.
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the trust, 176 thereby reducing its current "distributable" income to Sue.
Thus, there appears to be ample room for tax deferral on the corporate
dividends or any other income received by the trust. Tom, of course,
avoids the dividend tax altogether, but he also loses the income for the
period the stock is held in trust.
When compared to current law, in which Sue or the trust would be
taxed each year on the trust income, the flat tax offers the best deal by
never taxing anyone on the dividend income. The USA tax generally
places second best, although there is the possibility of tax-free accumulation of trust income. This accumulated income could be used, perhaps,
to pay some expenses that arguably would not be deductible by Sue had
she paid them herself (lawyers fees, for example). Additionally; some
tax-free borrowing by the trust would provide more potential tax
avoidance fodder, all of this without necessarily using the alimony trust
exclusively as a "savings" or "brokerage" account, as the proponents of
the USA tax would lead us to believe. Postponing the payment of tax
is also still a formidable part of these proposals.
C.

Deferred Compensation Trusts: (The "Non-Qualified" Type)
1.

Fact Pattern

After his divorce from Sue, Tom expanded his fast food franchise
operations. He formed a new corporation, Apple Valley, Inc. (Apple),
which entered into agreements with Boston Foods, Inc., a national
franchisor, to own and operate four franchise locations. Tom brought in
three additional, unrelated investors in Apple, with each investor,
including Tom, owning one~ fourth of the common stock of Apple.
Apple became highly profitable in a short period of time. Tom managed
these franchises. There was a "qualified" retirement plan 177 for the
regular employees, but Tom and his co-investors decided to establish a
"non-qualified" deferred compensation plan solely for Tom, in order to

176. The statute, as currently drafted, does not appear to extend the unlimited saving
account deduction to trusts, but we are assuming that will be corrected in any final draft.
177. I.R.C. §§ 401-417 contain detailed requirements for qualified plans. The Small
Business Job Protection Act of 1996, H.R. 3448, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996), makes
several changes in the pension and retirement area, principally with regard to the
simplification of"qualified plans". Except for nonqualified deferred compensation plans
for state and local governmental employees, I.R.C. § 457, the type of plan discussed in
this Article is not changed.
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avoid the restrictions on highly paid (''top hat") employees in the regular
retirement plan. 178
To give Tom some assurance that he wouid receive the money at
retirement, the employer, Apple, contributed the deferred portion of his
salary ($100,000) to an irrevocable trust, administered by an independent
trustee. The trust was.not specially funded, 179 only the annual deferred
salary was contributed to it. The deferred compensation plan for Tom
was in compliance with IRS procedures. Furthermore, in accordance
with IRS rules, the principal and income from the trust was subject to
claims of the employer's creditors in the event of the employer's
insolvency. 180 In effect, the trust funds are deemed owned by the
corporate employer until Tom's retirement. As beneficiary of the trust,
Tom had more protection than a mere naked promise to pay his
compensation at a future time. The trust fund was segregated from the
corporation's general funds, subject to creditor's rights.

2.

Results Under Current Tax Law

In contrast to a "qualified" retirement plan, where the Code and
Regulations contain enormously detailed requirements, the nonqualified
plan is curiously subject to relatively few requirements. 181 In general,
qualified plans permit employer and employee contributions to a taxexempt trust, in which the income earned by the trust is not taxable until
distributed to the employee at retirement. With specific dollar limits on
each type of qualified plan, the amounts contributed by the employer are
currently deductible from its gross income. 182 The employee excludes
the employer's contribution (as well as her own, in most cases) from
current gross income, and is not taxed until the amounts are received at
178. For example,§§ 401(a)(4) and 414(q) provide for disqualification ofa plan that
discriminates in favor of"highly compensated employees". I.R.C. §§ 40l(a)(4), 414(q)
(1996).
179. The nonqualified plan is deemed "unfunded" since the contribution to a trust
is not vested in the employee and remains essentially an unsecured promise to pay.
180. Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422. This is the model grantor trust for
unfunded deferred compensation arrangements, popularly known as "rabbi trusts".
181. The principal provisions applicable to qualified plans are found in I.R.C.
§§ 401-417 (1996).
182. The "reasonable" salary limits apply to retirement plan contributions as well
as to cash remuneration. Id. § 162(a)(l) I.R.C. § 162(m) imposes a $1 million cap on
certain executive salaries, but the ceiling is lifted when it can be demonstrated (as it
usually will be) that the employee's salary is based on "performance" factors.
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retirement or earlier, if permitted. This is, indeed, the largest fringe
benefit in the current income tax system. The Treasury Department
estimates a revenue loss in excess of $60 billion per year caused by the
postponement of Federal income tax on employer-sponsored. qualified
pension and retirement plans. 183
In a nonqualified deferred compensation plan, the employer promises
to hold part or all of the employee's salary until some future event,
usually retirement. The employee is normally a highly-paid executive
who is purposely not included in the qualified plan for the regular
workers, in order to avoid the anti-discrimination rules. 184 However,
unlike the qualified retirement plan, the employer cannot deduct the
deferred salary until the employee receives it years later. The company,
in effect, subsidizes the tax deferral by foregoing a current deduction and
by paying taxes as the income is earned on the deferred amount. In
other words, there is no tax-free build up as there is in the qualified
pension trust. When the nonqualified plan consists of a mere promise
to pay, "not represented by notes or secured in any way," the Service's
rulings have long held that there is no "constructive receipt" of income
for cash method taxpayers. 185
When, as in our example, the deferred compensation arrangement
involves the use of a trust, the plot thickens. The requirement that the
trust not be "funded" means that the contributions to the trust are legally
owned by the employer-grantor. The employee is deemed to be an
unsecured creditor and can receive the proceeds of the trust at retirement
only if the employer remains solvent. It is deemed a contingent promise.
These trusts are called "rabbi trusts" because of a 1981 letter ruling
183. Tax Expenditures Chapter From The President's Fiscal 1996 Budget, 66 TAX
NOTES 1037, 1040 (1995). In one sense, the high cost of this tax subsidy is one of the
motivating forces underlying the movement to a consumption type tax which broadens
the savings base beyond tax favored pension plans and the like. However, Congress
should not adopt a radical or rapid change in the current system without recognizing the
potential negative impact on the Treasury, the stock market, and the millions of
American workers. Private pension plans are estimated to have assets of nearly $ 4
trillion, and account for 20-25% of the total equity in corporations. Lester B. Snyder &
Jerry G. Gonick, The Interrelationship of Securities Class Action Litigation and Pension
Plan Tax Policy: What's Really At Stake?, 21 SEC. REG. L.J. 123, 137 (1993); see also
John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate
Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1291 (1991).
.
184. Daniel I. Halperin, Special Tax Treatment For Employer-Based Retirement
Programs: Is It "Still" Viable as a Means of Increasing Retirement Income? Should
It Continue?, 49 TAX L. REV. 1, 22 (1993).
185. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174; see also Sproull v. Commissioner, 16 T.C.
244 (1951), aff'd per curiam, 194 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1952); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.451-l(a),
1.451-2(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.402(b)-l(c)(l) (application of the annuity rules in § 72 on
the taxability of receipt by beneficiary). Social security taxes are deductible by the
employer when the wages are actually or constructively paid. Id. § 31.3111-3.

1528

[VOL. 33: 1485, 1996]

Evaluating the Consumption Tax Proposals
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

holding that a rabbi of a congregation was not taxable on the principal
of a trust until he received it at retirement. The rationale used by the
Service was that the trust assets were subject to the claims of his
employer's ,creditors and were therefore subject to substantial limitations
or restrictions. 186 Because of the uncertainty that developed as to the
proper treatment of these trusts, in 1992 .the. IRS published a "model"
rabbi trust that would receive "safe harbor" treatment in deferring
compensation, 187 so that the employee would not be in constructive
receipt of the assets in the trust until actual receipt in later years.
Despite the IRS 's reticence in blessing these plans, there has been a
dramatic growth in the "earn now, pay later" arrangements in the past
ten or so years, particularly for highly-paid executives in many large
public companies. 188
If the nonqualified deferred compensation trust is in compliance with
the Service guidelines, 189 Tom and his corporate employer, Apple, will
have the following tax results: (1) the transfer of the $100,000 of his
earnings to the employer controlled trust account will not be deemed a
transfer of property to Tom since it is an· unsecured promise to pay
money in the future; 190 (2) Apple, as grantor of the trust which was
established to discharge its legal obligation, will be treated as owner of
the trust and thus taxable on all the income (less deductions) of the
trust-the trust itself is not a taxable entity, unless it fails to qualify as

186. Priv. Ltr. Ru!. 81-13-107 (Dec. 30, 1980).
187. Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422. "Rabbi trusts" reportedly account for as
much as 70% of nonqualified deferred compensation of highly paid executives at large
public companies. Halperin, supra note 184, at 22 (citing Lee A. Sheppard, Brisendine
Provides Rabbi Trust Update, 93 TAX NOTES TODAY 247-8, Dec. 6, 1993, available in
Westlaw, TNT database, 96 TNT 247-8) (A. Thomas Brisendine is an IRS Branch Chief
in the Employee Benefits section of the national office).
188. For an interesting article on the use of these plans by specific executives at
several corporations, see Christopher Drew & David C. Johnson, Special Tax Breaks
Enrich Savings of Many in the Ranks of Management, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1996, at 1.
189. It is assumed in our case that since Tom owns only 25% of the Apple stock
he is not a controlling shareholder of Apple and thus is eligible to defer his compensation. Rev. Proc. 88-3, 1988-1 C.B. 29. It is further assumed, although not free from
doubt, that the deferred compensation trust can be permitted to invest its funds in the
employer's stock without violating the "prohibited transaction" excise tax which was
raised from 5% to 10% in the recently enacted Small Business Job Protection Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1453, 110 Stat. 1755 (1996).
190. I.R.C. § 83(a) (1996); Treas. Reg. sec. l.83-3(e); I.R.C. § 402(b).
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a "rabbi trust"; 191 (3) Tom will not be taxed until he receives payments
from the trust; 192 and (4) Apple will not be allowed a deduction for the
deferred compensation until actually received by Tom. 193
Tom's use of the "rabbi trust" results in a gamble that the
corporation's assets could be seized by its creditors. But the presumed
conventional benefits of tax deferral, together with the lower corporate
tax rate (34 percent) on Apple's inclusion of the trust investment income
on its tax return rather than on the higher rate (39.6 percent) trust tax
return, make the gamble worth taking under current law at least. An
added benefit to taxing the investment income to the corporate employer
(under the grantor trust rules), rather than to the trust or to the employee,
is the 70-100 percent dividends-received deduction available only to
corporate shareholders. 194 Thus, Tom's $100,000 deferred compensation, if invested in stocks of other corporations, would result in no more
than a 10.2 percent tax [34 percent corporate rate x $30,000 net
dividend] on the dividends received, rather than 39.6 percent if taxed to
the trust or directly to Tom, had he taken the $100,000 as current cash
compensation and invested it himself. 195

3.

Results Under the Flat Tax

As discussed above, in the context of alimony trusts, the flat tax
proponents tell us that their tax system ignores trusts since it receives
only after-tax income (income already assessed under the business level
tax). 196 What then happens to deferred compensation plans such as
"rabbi trusts"? The answer to that question depends first on how current
labor compensation is itself taxed.
The tax treatment of labor under both tax proposals creates problems
in two broad respects. 197 Under the USA tax, employee labor costs are
not deductible by the business employer, purportedly following the VAT
policy of not allowing labor cost deductions (since they are part of the
191. I.R.C. §§ 673-677; Treas. Reg. § l.677(a)-l(d). If the trust should fail to
qualify as a "rabbi trust" the income of the trust would probably be taxed at rates higher
than corporate rates---39.6% for trust taxable income over $7,900 vs. 34% on corporate
taxable income over $75,000. I.R.C. §§ l(e), 1 l(b).
192. I.R.C. § 451; Treas. Reg. § 1.451-l(a).
193. I.R.C. § 404(a)(5); Treas. Reg. § l.404(a)-12(b)(2).
194. I.R.C. § 243.
195. Note that the "rabbi trusts" are generally not permitted to invest in the
employer's stock. Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422. For a thoughtful analysis of the
differences or tax equivalencies between taking current compensation and qualified and
nonqualified ("rabbi") trusts, see Halperin, supra note 184.
196. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
I 97. Some of the material in this section is taken from Snyder & Gallegos, supra
note 3, at 35-37.
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measure of taxable "value added"). 198 Employees, however, are
taxable on wages under the USA tax, the same as other income. 199
When labor is not deductible by the employer, the amount paid as
salaries and wages is in effect taxed at the business level. On the other
hand, the flat tax allows a labor cost deduction to the business employer,
but taxes only wages (and no other income) to the employee.
As for deferred compensation, the flat tax statute expressly allows a
deduction to the employer for contributions to "qualified" plans. 200
Employer (and employee) contributions to a qualified retirement plan are
not included in current taxable income of the employee.201 The
employee is taxed, as under current law, when the benefits are received
in later years. 202 This is contrary to the normal treatment of other
investments under the flat tax, in which wages are taxed currently and
subsequent investment returns are excluded from income.
The fate of nonqualified deferred compensation plans ("rabbi trusts")
is not clear under the flat tax. In fact, since trusts are non-existent for
fiat tax purposes, do the constructive receipt or economic benefit rules
under current law prevent the use of specially-funded trusts exclusively

198. While neither proposal attempts to coordinate the separate social security tax
provisions, there is a novel payroll tax credit, however, under the USA tax. The 7.65%
payroll tax paid by employers remains intact under both the USA tax and flat tax. Since
this payroll tax is deductible under current law, there would be an additional tax burden
under the USA tax with nondeductible salaries and wages. The credit serves as a
mitigation of that burden, but so long as the tax rate on employers (11 %) exceeds the
7.65% rate there is still a disparity. The payroll tax credit also applies at the employee
level.
199. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
200. H.R. 2060, supra note 1, §§ 1 l(d)(l)(C), 63(c). While claiming to eliminate
most of the Internal Revenue Code, the flat tax retains most of the detailed requirements
of the retirement and pension plan rules (however, with considerable simplification in
the anti-discrimination rules and limits on contributions, consistent with the goal of the
flat tax to provide incentives to invest). Id. § 106. Unlike the USA tax, S.722, supra
note 2, §§ 281-283, which provides a credit for social security taxes, the flat tax offers
no such benefit for public retirement as it does for private retirement plans. The
underlying policy for the payroll tax credit is discussed in Snyder & Gallegos, supra
note 3, at 49-50 & n.194.
201. H.R. 2060, supra note 1, § 1 l(d); HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 64, at 130.
202. Since the flat tax rate (say, 17%) is applicable to both the company and the
employee, as well as to compensation received currently and at retirement, the concept
of deferral itself may require reconsideration in a new "time value of money" regime.
See, e.g., Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value of Money",
95 YALE L.J. 506 (1986); Halperin, supra note 184.
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for executives?203 We should remind ourselves that the federal tax
reforms do not generally override state law (unless the state consents, as
in state tax laws). 204 Unless some form of human immortality is on
the horizon, estates and trusts will continue to be created.205
In those instances when the company arid the employee prefer to defer
payment of wages to an executive through a fully vested trust (protected
from creditors of the company), it is not clear whether the flat tax retains
the constructive receipt provisions.206 The IRS, or similar administrative agency, and the courts would then be required to decide whether
deferred "wages" are taxed' now or later. If taxed currently, then the
need to value the portion of wages placed into a trust for later distribution to the employee triggers complex "present value" calculations. 207
However, interpretations of the flat tax will not necessarily follow
principles in our present · income tax. Indeed, the consumption tax
precepts favor reinvestment of capital and income.
But do Tom and his compatriots at Apple really need a deferred
compensation plan? There may, in fact, be a better way to reduce taxes
under the flat tax, one which is quite consistent with the goals of those
advocating its adoption. Remember that "economic growth" is what
they have in mind. In fact, they want businesses to do exactly what they

203. See supra note 198. In defining "retirement distributions," the flat tax statute
refers to tax exempt trusts under I.R.C. § 50l(a) (1996). The reference to "trusts"
presumably refers to "qualified" pension plan trusts, and acknowledges the existence of
trusts for some purposes. H.R. 2060, supra note 1, § 63(c)(l).
204. Michael Mazerov & Dan R. Bucks, Federal Tax Restructuring and State and
Local Governments: an introduction to the Issues and the Literature, 33 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1459 (1997).
205. Undoubtedly, articles will be written on the effect of tax reform on state law,
including community property law, where fundamental rights and obligations are first
identified.
206. H.R. 2060, supra note 1, § 63(a)(l)(A) (taxes wages "received during the
taxable year"). We cannot find any reference to I.R.C. § 451 (or the regulations
thereunder), which contains the constructive receipt rules. Under current law, as set
forth above, the contribution by an employer of deferred compensation to an unrestricted
trust for an employee is deemed constructive receipt. The flat tax purports to "repeal"
the current income tax law, but retains the pension plan rules in I.R.C. §§ 401-420. H.R.
2060, supra note 1, § 106(b). It appears, however, that the statute, as now written at
least, allows an employer deduction only for amounts contributed to specified plans,
none of which is a nonqualified deferred compensation plan. See id. §§ 1 l(d)(l)(C),
63(c). The reference to "eligible deferred compensation plan" (as defined in I.R.C.
§ 457)--which covers only governrnental employees--would indicate that the proponents
of the flat tax presumed that other nonqualified plans ("rabbi" and regular trusts) were
taxable currently. Since I.R.C. § 83 is also repealed, as well as the rulings under current
law holding that transfers to "rabbi" trusts were not completed transfers, the flat tax
resurrects the valuation and timing issues that § 83 was intended to resolve.
207. For an example of such a ruling under current law, see Priv. Ltr. Ru!. 92-06009 (Nov. 11, 1991).
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cannot do under current law-plow back the profits into business
expansion, purchase new equipment, and defer taxing profits, not labor.
The centerpiece of both the :flat tax and USA tax, under the business
tax component of these proposals, would allow full deductions for
"business" assets purchased in the. current year-no depreciation
schedules or other. recovery of capital concerns, as under current
law. 208 This should be contrasted with the "penalty" tax on accumulated earnings under current corporate tax law, when a 39.6 percent tax is
imposed almost exclusively on closely-held corporations, which are
required to prove that the earnings are retained "for the reasonable needs
of the business."209 Although the penalty tax may not be a major
source of litigation, it serves as an inhibiting factor in the growth of
some small businesses. To illustrate this issue again, as we did in our
discussion of the Arnes case in Part II of this Article,2 10 if Tom could
forego a portion of his salary (that he would have deferred under current
law) and instead allow it to be retained by the corporation for expansion
of the business, the consequences to the corporation and Tom would be
greater after-tax yields. If Tom spends more managerial time at Apple
than the other investors, stock options211 or dividends from a specially
created class of stock could provide a higher after-tax return. Thus, the
portion of Tom's salary which is retained by the corporation is not
deductible as· such, but the purchase of new assets provides the same
result. Converting the taxable salary to non-taxable dividends or stock

. 208. H.R. 2060, supra note 1, § 1l(d)(2)(A)(i). The deduction is referred to as a
"business input" for "the amount paid for property sold or used in connection with a
business activity". Curiously, wages and retirement benefits are deductible from "gross
active income" under §§ 1l(d)(l)(B), (C), but are excluded from the definition of
"business input" by§ 11 (d)(2)(A)(i), along with "personal use" property not connected
with a business activity. Perhaps this is explained as an attempt at GATT and VAT
compliance where labor costs are technically part of the value_ added tax base, and thus
also explaining the rationale for taxing only wages in the component of the flat tax
which taxes individuals. See Avi-Yonah, Income to Consumption, supra note 136;
Schenk, supra note 86.
209. I.R.C. §§ 531, 535(c) (1996). The supposed rationale for this tax is to preclude
the retention of earnings in a corporation instead of distributing them as taxable
dividends to the shareholders.
210. See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
211. It appears that stock options are not "cash" wages and thus not taxable on the
spread between the exercise price and the fair market value of the stock (which should
increase with expansion of Apple). Compare Stock options under the USA tax, in which
the purchase of the stock is allowed as a savings deduction. S. 722, supra note 2, §§ 5053.
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options allows both Tom and Apple to avoid taxes (even though the
seventeen percent tax rate is applicable to the business and Tom) at both
the business tax and individual tax levels. This plan may invite "tax
avoidance" scrutiny by the IRS under current law, but appears affirmatively legitimate under the consumption-tax philosophy of the flat tax.

4.

Results Under the USA Tax

The problems with "rabbi trusts" and other nonqualified deferred
compensation plans disappear under the USA tax. The employer is not
allowed to deduct wages, salaries, or other cash payable for services by
"employees,"212 including contributions to "retirement" plans. 2 1:1
However, there are a number of tax-deferral options available under the
USA tax, which are not as readily available under present law. Many
of these choices allow the employer to be the savings vehicle by holding
the funds for business use. For example, employees are not taxed until
they actually receive their salaries, permitting a simple deferred
compensation contract. If the employee wants protection against the
employer's creditors, the parties can utilize a funded trust account
without the need to comply with the "rabbi" trust rules. The key to this
flexibility is the "unlimited savings account," in which amounts
contributed to a trust fund, on behalf of an employee (or by the
employee himself or herself), are deemed "savings" and, thus, offset the
inclusion of current salary or other income.214 This applies to all
retirement plans. In addition, the investment income accumulated in the
trust fund is not taxed until deemed withdrawn under the net savings
rules of the USA tax. 215 As described above, 216 trusts, as such, are
not taxable entities under the USA tax; beneficiaries are taxed only on
distributions (other than certain expenses paid by the trust). Thus, if a
beneficiary receives a distribution and does not re-invest it in conformity
with the savings rules, the beneficiary will be then taxed on that amount
as consumption.
Tom and Apple have considerable flexibility in deferring taxes in this
context. Tom can receive special dividends on his stock, reinvest the

212. Payments to "independent contractors" (self-employed businesses) are
deductible, however. For problems caused by retaining this present law distinction, see
Snyder & Gallegos, supra note 3, at 47-49.
213. S. 722, supra note 2, §§ 205(a)(4)(A), 205(a)(4)(D)(i).
214. Christian & Schutzer, supra note 170, at 1507, 1512-1513.
215. S. 722, supra note 2, §§ 50-58.
216. See supra Part III.B.4.
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dividends with Apple (for more stock), and, in effect, pay no current
tax. 217 Payment of dividends by Apple will not entitle it, however, to
the payroll tax credit. They can enter into a deferred compensation
arrangement in which the salary (or a portion of it) is contributed to a
trust, 218 resulting in a net savings deduction to Tom as an offset to his
deferred compensation. Whether the trust can then purchase the
employer's stock may be problematic, but it does not appear to be a
"prohibited transaction" under the more liberal savings rules of the USA
tax. 219 Furthermore, the employer's purchase should be less problematic when, as in the case of Tom, the employee is not a majority
shareholder of the purchasing company.
In sum, the net savings deduction refocuses our views on tax planning
by providing Tom and his employer more intentionally tax-favored
alternatives. The fact that the business employer receives no deduction
for compensation-related payments could impact some incentive for
employer-based pension plans in the future. However, some companies,
such as Apple, may enjoy more growth and expansion by purchasing
fully deductible assets. The variables will require careful planning in
each case, and unlike the flat tax, with one rate for businesses and
individuals (seventeen percent), the USA tax, with different rates for
businesses (eleven percent) and individuals (eight to forty percent), will
require even more reliance on accountants and tax lawyers.

IV.

CONCLUSION ·

The flat tax and, to a lesser extent, the USA tax are much simpler than
the current income tax. Both proposals are a more efficient way to tax
capital investors-an improvement over the ambiguities inherent in the
meaning of "capital gains," and an elimination of the never-ending

217. S. 722, supra note 2, §§ 50-58, 53(b). Individuals can deduct purchases of
financial assets (such as stock); businesses can deduct purchases of business assets, but
not financial assets, such as stock in another corporation. Peter L. Faber, Tax Reform
and Corporate Acquisitions, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1541 (1997).
218. The taxability of trust income to the employer corporation under the grantor
trust rules of present law as to nonqualified plans is deemed unnecessary under the USA
tax, where trusts are generally not taxed, thus perhaps explaining the provision which
does not permit corporations to· be grantors in grantor trusts. S. 722, supra note 2,
§ 144.
219. The model "rabbi trust," under current law, generally prohibits ownership of
the employer's stock by the trust. See supra note 196.
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wrangling in Congress on lowering the rates on these gains. The central
feature of the business tax under both proposals--an immediate
expensing of business asset purchases-may well accomplish the goal of
shifting the tax advantage away from labor and retirement compensation
toward significantly more accumulation of business and investment
profits. The flat tax creates a new exclusion from taxation of income
from savings and investment for individuals; the USA tax essentially
postpones taxation of this type of income. Tax-favored treatment of
savings thereby becomes the norm of the new tax system, not the
exception thereto, as under current tax law. Both proposals, however,
have their own serious flaws. The treatment of borrowed money is only
partially dealt with under the USA tax, and totally ignored under the flat
tax. As a result, in a system which puts its main emphasis on the
assumed distinctions between taxable "consumption" and non-taxable
"savings," borrowed money can be used for both purposes without limit,
thus encouraging tax avoidance schemes which are not consistent with
the policy goals of these proposals.
The flat tax's failure to recognize the existence of trusts and estates as
separate entities may, in many instances, represent a simplification of a
complex Subchapter of the present Code. Yet, with both trust and
beneficiary exempt from tax, for all time, have they not taken the goal
to avoid double-taxation too far? Likewise, the USA tax, by imposing
a tax on distributions to beneficiaries, but not upon the trust entity, has
neglected to recognize the various types of trusts in this country, many
of which do not resemble a "savings or brokerage" account. The
traditional state law distinctions between "corpus" and "income" will be
more difficult to trace without a centralized entity.
The elimination of the need for a deferred compensation trust under
both the flat tax and USA tax can be scored as a simplification. While
top executives might miss the "rabbi trust," they have many more
options to defer wages, including the savings deduction under the USA
tax or the conversion of wages into dividends or stock options under the
flat tax. But the non-deductibility of labor costs and retirement
contributions under the USA tax may jeopardize the present $4 trillion
private pension plan system in this country, if employers decide to
reduce these benefits for the average worker.
Critics of these consumption tax proposals label them as nothing more
than a "wage" tax and a shifting of the tax burden to labor. A closer
look at the current tax law, however, shows that eighty to eighty-five
percent of the income tax revenue collected by the government already
comes from wage and service related income.
In the final analysis, those of us who have accommodated our life
styles to the present law should not fear its improvement, or even radical
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change. Instead of sitting back and assuming that "it will never
happen," we should assume that such change is a distinct possibility.
We would be better advised to seriously analyze the new tax proposals
(and the many more to come) and their impact on international trade,
small businesses, pension plans, and the stock market. There is a need
to fashion the most equitable transition from the present system, while
we examine further strengths and weaknesses in tax reform proposals.
The flat tax and USA tax require further work, but we do a disservice
to ourselves in embracing the current income tax which was written for
a different economic era.
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APPENDIX
EFFECT OF BORROWING ON TAX DEFERRAL

The table below illustrates how borrowed money may be used in a
business setting to defer taxes even more than apparently allowed under
the :flat tax proposal as written. The example assumes a 20% tax rate,
a 10% annual yield on business investments, a 10% interest refurid
component on loss carryforwards, and a 10% interest rate on the loan
(thus also eliminating arbitrage effects-which would only exacerbate this
phenomenon). [This illustration is made using the :flat tax proposal;
generally, the same illustration could apply to the USA tax as well.]
The business borrows $100 in year 0, giving the lender a note bearing
10% interest per year. The loan is paid back in five equal installments
of $26.38, consisting of principal and interest, beginning at the end of
year 1. [The business buys new equipment for $ 100 in year 0 in
preparation for sales beginning in year 1.] The :flat tax allows the
business to deduct the full $100 purchase price in year 0, the year of
purchase. (Interest on the loan is not deductible, adopting the VAT
concepts.) However, assuming that the business has insufficient income
in year 0, the :flat tax allows the business taxpayer an unlimited
operating loss carryforward of the unused $100 purchase deduction with
the addition of an interest refund component of $10, for a total
carryforward to year 1 of $110. H.R. 2060, supra note 1, sections
11 (d)(2)(A)(i).
Using the new equipment, the business generates $100 in sales in each
of the five years that the loan is paid back. Variable expenses equal $50
per year and do not include interest on the loan. The cash remaining
after the loan payment is made and taxes are paid is shown in the table
as remaining with the business, but under the :flat tax it could be
distributed tax-free to the owners.
The business pays no tax until year 3. However, if the business were
to reinvest the remaining cash in additional business assets at any time
through year 3, when it first begins to pay taxes in this example, it could
augment its tax deferral by creating new loss carryforwards, offering
expansion opportunities as well.
The AICPA guide to the consumption tax debate (see supra note 74)
advocates the exclusion of borrowed money from income on the theory
that loan proceeds represent the net present value of the cash stream of
loan repayments (including interest). The table demonstrates this
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principle. However, when the business uses these loan proceeds to
generate loss carryforwards that free up cash and defer taxes, it obtains
a significant benefit from the use of borrowed money, which would
refute the AICPA's exclusion of borrowed money from the tax base. As
the table shows, the before tax cash remaining at the end· of year 5 is
$141.84, and $115.36 after taxes for the entire period. The use of $100
of borrowed funds produced a net before tax yield of 41.84% and an
after tax yield of 15.36%. Moreover, the tax paid ($26.48) was deferred
until years 3 to 5.
·
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ITEM/YEAR

YEAR I

YEAR 2

YEAR 3

YEAR4

YEARS

Sales

100

100

100

100

100

Expenses

50

50

50

50

50

Gross Profit

50

50

50

50

50

110

66

17.6

0

0

0

0

32.4

50

50

0

0

6.48

IO

IO

60

16

0

0

0

(sales-exp.)
Loss Carryfwd
(+10% int)
Taxable
Income
Tax Paid
(20%)
Remaining
Loss
Carryfwd
Cash on

,.

50

50

43.52

40

40

Hand (sales·•.

expensestax pd)
Loan Payment

26.38

26.38

26.38

26.38

26.38

Cash

23.62

23.62

17.14

13.62

13.62

25.98

54.56

78.87

101.74

49.60

71.70

92.49

115.36

Remaining
Total Cash

0

on Hand From
Previous
Period+ 10%
Return
Total Cash on
Hand at End
of Period
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23.62

